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Abstract—In this survey, we give an extensive overview
on honeypots. This includes not only honeypot software
but also methodologies to analyse honeypot data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Effective network security administration depends to a
great extent on the understanding of existing and emerg-
ing threats on the Internet. In order to protect information
systems and its users it is of crucial importance to
collect accurate, concise, high-quality information about
malicious activities [1], [2]. The fact that cyber attacks
are a present threat is confirmed by recent statistics
such as the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
[3] or the attacks report by ATLAS [4]. The discovery
of vulnerabilities such as Heartbleed, ShellShock, and
Poodle, and their wide-spread prevalence across a num-
ber of operating systems draw the public attention to
system security. As observed with Heartbleed, attackers
were much faster in exploiting the vulnerabilities than
vendors could create and roll out patches. Relying only
upon tradition lines of defence such as Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems (IDSs) and dynamic firewalls alone does
not provide a holistic coverage on detecting novel and
emerging patterns of attacks [5]. Honeypots are decoy
computer resources whose value lies in being probed,
attacked or compromised [6]. They complement the
traditional detection mechanisms [7]. Honeypots are able
to spot zero-day attacks and give insights on attackers
actions and motivation.
The field of honeypot research consists of two main
pillars: a) the development of honeypot software and its
effective deployment b) the analysis of the acquired log
data in a structured manner.
Honeypot surveys and software comparisons have
been presented before, however an up-to-date compari-
son and classification of honeypot software does not exist
according to our current knowledge. Moreover, none of
the surveys focus on creating an overview of related
data analysis techniques. Based on questions imposed
by the data analysis, a practice-oriented review of these
techniques will be presented. Eventually, the question
will be elaborated which honeypot should be deployed
and how the log records should be analysed.
First surveys in the field of honeypot research pre-
sented in 2003 include only a small subset of meanwhile
available software and are by this time outdated [8].
Unfortunately, papers tend to only discuss a small subset
of honeypot software or mention examples which denies
a holistic view [9]–[12]. Mairh et al. [13] presented in
2011 a honeypot survey, which illustrates the differ-
ent types of honeypots and suggests to use honeypots
in educational environments. Deployment of honeypots
is only done by the example of HoneyD. In 2012,
Bringer [14] published the by far most exhaustive survey
on recent advances in the field of honeypots by ordering
a large amount of honeypot related papers by contentual
category. However, it rather only considers new types of
honeypot software and misses the historical development
of honeypot software. Also the software release date and
maintenance time spans remain unanswered, which are
an indicator for the current deployability.
In this survey, we give an extensive overview about
honeypot software as well as methodologies to analyze
honeypot data. We briefly discuss ethical and legal
concerns. Figure 1 shows an overview about the specific
topics of this paper, including guidance of the paper
structure.
II. BASIC BACKGROUND ABOUT HONEYPOTS
The first academic publication including explicitly
the keyword honeypot dates back to the beginning of
2000 [15], [16]. One of the first broadly accepted formal
definitions was introduced by Spitzner [6]: A honeypot
is decoy computer resource whose value lies in being
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Figure 1. Categorisation of honeypot literature.
probed, attacked or compromised. However, the concept
of honeypots is not new and was already used implicitly
in the 1990s in the field of information protection and
network defences [17], [18], but was named differently,
for example a (chroot) jail [19]. Later, multiple honey-
pots have been interconnected, called honeynet.
At the beginning of the year 2000, highly effective
Unix- and Windows-based worms spread exponentially
[20]. Despite the extensive distribution, capturing and
analysing this incident was fairly difficult as the worms
only resided in the systems memory or masqueraded
themselves. One of the first honeypots dedicated to a
known threat was used to analyse the sub7 malware.
The honeypot emulated a Windows system infected by
the sub7 trojan by responding on port 27374, which
many worms used for subsequent attacks. The SANS
Institute [21] captured the W32/Leaves worm within
minutes. Hereafter, in the year 2002, a honeypot captured
the first unknown threat, the CDE Subprocess Control
Service buffer overflow. This vulnerability allowed to
gain access to any Unix-based system [22]. A possible
defence was introduced quickly. Since then honeypots
have been established as an effective concept against
vulnerabilities.
The general objective of a honeypot is either to distract
attackers from their actual target, or to gather information
about the attackers and attack patterns, such as the set
of popular target hosts and the frequency of requests-
responses. However, it is worth noting that honeypots
should not be considered as an implementation to solve
a certain problem but rather as a generic concept.
Regardless of where and how honeypot are deployed
(e.g. a router, scripts emulating specific services, virtual
machines, or a standard physical system), honeypots
contribute by being exposed to attacks.
A. Distinction to Other Security Concepts
Security concepts can be classified by the areas of
operation which are prevention, detection, and reaction
[23]. Prevention can be defined as any undertaking
which (i) discourages intruders and (ii) makes breaches
in the system infeasible. Detection is the process of
identifying the presence of actions that harm the systems
(i) confidentiality, (ii) integrity and (iii) availability. Re-
action describes the execution of reactive measures after
detecting harmful actions. Ideally, reaction reinforces
prevention and improves future detections. Security con-
cepts are designed to accomplish best results in their
area of operation, which leads to inferior results in the
remaining areas.
Besides honeypots, a combination of firewalls, intru-
sion detection systems (IDS), anti-virus (AV), intrusion
prevention systems (IPS), and log-monitoring can be
used to improve network security. It is important to
differentiate these concepts in order to use them to their
full potential [13]. Traditionally, firewalls monitor and
control network traffic based on predetermined, static
security rules. They act as a barrier between secure and
insecure networks. Advanced firewalls filter not only by
network attributes, but also protocol states and applica-
tion layer rules. IDS analyze whole packets, both header
and payload, looking for malicious signatures. When a
known event is detected an alert is generated. IPSs can
be understood as an extension of IPS which not only
issue alerts, but actively reject packets and dynamically
add new rules. AV software is also signature based, but
operates on a file-level and tries to capture infections
by a trojan or virus. Complete log-monitoring of ap-
plication logs, service logs, system logs etc. increases
the awareness of network infrastructure or availability
problems. Problems are detected by evaluating the log
files statistically for known text patterns that indicate
important events. Cyber security standards prevent at-
tacks by defining security guidelines for the software and
infrastructure, such as a clean configuration, hardened
kernel and recent updates. Nowadays a clear distinction
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between these concepts became difficult, as security
solutions are hybrids that combine several concepts in
order to minimize the individual trade-off.
Honeypots add little value directly to prevention as
they do not protect against security breaches. At most,
they inhibit attacks because attackers are concerned
about wasting time and resources attacking honeypots
instead of the actual target: production systems. How-
ever, they fail against automated toolkits and worms,
which form one of the most common attack types and
which scan, probe and try to exploit every network
participant they can find. This also holds for intrusion
detection systems, they might deter, however they will
not actively prevent automated attacks. Firewalls are the
best concept for prevention, as they hide services and
block communication on unused ports or from suspicious
IP-address-ranges, so that intruders are kept out or do not
find any services to communicate with. Best prevention
is achieved by good cyber security standards and prac-
tices, such as disabling unnecessary or insecure services,
frequent update and patch policies, strong authentication
mechanisms and so on.
If detection is concerned, honeypots add extensive
value. It is very difficult to detect attacks on produc-
tion systems because the attacks simply submerge in
the vast amount of production activity. Honeypots can
simplify the detection process. Since honeypots have no
production activity, all connections to the honeypot are
suspect by nature and therefore detect an unauthorized
probe, scan, or attack with almost no false positives
and negatives. As the name suggests, intrusion detection
systems are designed to detect attacks. However, their ef-
fectiveness is highly dependant on the signature quality.
Administrators can be overwhelmed with false positives,
become numb and start to ignore those messages. On
the other hand, false negatives are also possible if no
appropriate signature exists as new exploits are used.
Snort developed an effective signature-based recognition
after years of community contribution. If we consider a
traditional firewall concept without the abilities such as
flow statistics (e.g., packet count), a firewall is signifi-
cantly limited in the detection of attacks.
The reaction to attacks can be accelerated with the
help of honeypots. The analysis of the attack is substan-
tially easier, as attack data is not mingled with production
activity data. Furthermore, in contrast to production sys-
tems, honeypots can be taken completely off-line for the
analysis, which enables a proper and full forensic analy-
sis. The insights can then be used to clean the production
systems and understand the exploit, which is the first
Table I
DISTINCTION BETWEEN SECURITY CONCEPTS
BASED ON AREAS OF OPERATION.
Objective Prevention Detection Reaction
Honeypot + ++ +++
Firewall +++ ++ +
Intrusion Detection Sys. + +++ +
Intrusion Prevention Sys. ++ +++ ++
Anti-Virus ++ ++ ++
Log-Monitoring + ++ +
Cyber Security Standard +++ + +
step to patch the corresponding vulnerabilities. Intrusion
detection systems are primarily passive, that means that
they analyse packets and create alerts. Traditionally, they
do not alter the network packet flow. They only inform
administrators about malicious activities. The reaction
to new attacks might also include the creation of new
signatures. As firewalls do not detect attacks, they cannot
react dynamically to attacks. However, administrators
can define new firewall rules manually, which are usually
simpler then the rules from an intrusion detection system
and are based rather on packet meta information than
payload and packet flow [16].
Our discussion on the different security concepts
shows that all concepts tend to have a specific ob-
jective. Primarily, honeypots implement reaction, IDSs
implement detection, and firewalls implement prevention
concepts. These concepts do not exclude but may com-
plement each other. To achieve all objectives (prevention,
detection, reaction), hybrid solutions such as IPSs have
been developed. We summarize our findings in Table I,
the number of (+) denotes the contribution level to
the various objectives. However, this rating should be
understood as a general trend of the overall capabili-
ties, since individual deployment might shift the focus
towards another objective.
B. Taxonomy of Honeypots
Marty Roesch, the developer of Snort, established one
of the first classifications of honeypots [16], separating
honeypots primarily based on their field of operation:
• production honeypots
• research honeypots
Production honeypots are characterized by ease of
deployment and utilization and are meant to be used in
production environments of companies. Their intended
purpose is to achieve a higher security level within
the network of one specific company by deflecting
attacks. However, the production honeypots come with a
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trade-off between ease of operation and the quantity of
collected information. By contrast, research honeypots
provide comprehensive information about attacks, but
are more difficult to deploy. They are usually used by
research organizations and network forensics scientists
in order to scrutinize attacks and to develop general
counter-measures against threats. Research honeypots
help to understand the motives, behaviour, tools, and
organization of the black-hat community.
To set an example: A company redirects incoming
traffic to unused IP-addresses to a SSH-honeypot. The
honeypot identifies the attackers by IP-addresses which
can be used in filter rules and block the access to the
production systems. The functionality of the honeypot
can be limited, as it only has to recognize the traffic
and its source. A research organization however might
be interested in studying the details of the attack, that is
which dictionaries were used to guess the passwords in
order to create a recommendation on password strength.
Consequently, they have to use a research honeypot,
which is more sophisticated and provides extensive log
records with SSH credentials.
Another widely used classification of honeypots is
based upon the characteristics of interaction, on the one
hand considering the level of interaction [24]:
• low-interaction honeypots (LIHP)
• medium-interaction honeypots (MIHP)
• high-interaction honeypots (HIHP)
On the other hand, considering the direction of the
interaction [25]:
• server honeypots
• client honeypots
Low-interaction honeypots simulate only a small set
of services like SSH or FTP, they do not provide any
access to the operating system to the attacker. LIHP
produce minimal responses in order to allow protocol
handshakes. As the collection of information is limited,
LIHP are used mainly for statistic evaluation. However,
they suffice to recognize peaks in the number of requests,
for example created by autonomous worms. LIHP tend
to be production honeypots.
Medium-interaction honeypots are slightly more so-
phisticated than LIHP, however they still do not provide
any operating system functionality. The simulated ser-
vices are more elaborated and provide a higher level of
interaction for the attacker, as a matter of fact MIHP
produce reasonable replies in hope of triggering follow-
up attacks. To be an attractive target, MIHP also emulate
more services than LIHP. Because of the reduced interac-
tion capabilities LIHP and MIHP both have low chances
of being compromised.
High-interaction honeypots are the most sophisticated
honeypots. They are the most complex to implement,
deploy and maintain, as they provide to the attacker
a real operating system environment, which is not re-
stricted. Furthermore, a huge set of services is installed.
HIHP collect the largest possible amount of information,
including complete attack logs, data access, traversing
of file trees, executed byte codes etc. Because of the
high complexity, HIHP log analysis is usually done by
networks forensics scientists and less frequently auto-
matically. HIHP tend to be research honeypots.
An overview of the properties with respect to the level
of interaction is presented by Table II. However, it is
important to point out that this classification is quite aca-
demic and impractical. Over time many different flavours
of honeypots were created which are very difficult to
divide into specific categories. That is why it became
common to only differentiate between low and high
honeypots, as recommended by Lance Spitzner [26].
Eventually, all honeypots that are mere port listeners
or emulate services became low interaction honeypots
(previously presented as low and medium) and anything
that provides real services and aspects of an operating
system a high-interaction honeypot [27].
Server Honeypots wait until the attackers initiate
the communication, whereas client honeypots actively
search for potential malicious entities and request an
interaction. The most common field of application are
web browsers: client honeypots request a homepage
and check for unusual activities. Client-LIHP emulate
components while client-HIHP use real web browsers.
Traditional honeypots are server based.
The last classification is based on the physicality of
the honeypot [28]:
• physical honeypots
• virtual honeypots
Evidently, a physical honeypot is a real machine on
the network. A virtual honeypot is simulated (virtualized)
by a host machine that forwards the network traffic to
the virtual honeypot. Multiple virtual honeypots can be
simulated on a single host. Virtual honeypots are usually
high-interaction honeypots.
C. Specification of Honeypot Attacks
A technological attack is defined as an attempt to
destroy, expose, alter, disable, steal or gain unautho-
rized access to or make unauthorized use of an asset;
where asset is defined as anything that has value to an
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Table II
PROPERTIES OF HONEYPOT INTERACTION LEVELS [12].
LIHP MIHP HIHP
real operating system 8 8 3
risk of compromise low mid high
wish of compromise 8 8 3
information gathering low mid high
knowledge to deploy low low high
knowledge to develop low high high
maintenance time low low very high
organization [29]. However, honeypots are not directly
of value, their value lies in being attacked. In order to
define what in particular a honeypot attack is, firstly
one has to accept the fact that honeypots are attacked
inadvertently, they are exposed to attacks which are
originally directed at production systems. That means
that attacks on honeypots are no different to other
systems as long as the attacker does not recognize the
presence of the honeypot. Second, one has to differ-
entiate between anomalous and normal behaviour. As
honeypots are controlled environments, one can tag any
anomalous behaviour as an attack [13]. However, this
specification requires the differentiation between server
and client honeypots. Server honeypots are completely
passive, therefore all incoming requests form an anomaly
and are by definition an attack. Client honeypots actively
search and contact communication partners, therefore
client honeypots must discern which communications
comprise an anomaly. Heuristics usually verify this by
looking after uncommon modifications.
D. Advantages and Disadvantages of Honeypots
Short and comprehensive lists presenting the advan-
tages and disadvantages of honeypots have been assessed
by several researchers [16], [24], [30]. We summarize the
different aspects as follows.
The advantages of honeypots include:
Valuable Data Collection Honeypots collect data
which is not polluted with noise from production
activities and which is usually of high value. This
makes data sets smaller and data analysis less
complex.
Independent from Workload Honeypots do only need
to process traffic which is directed at them or
originates from them. This means, that they are in-
dependent from the workload which the production
systems experience.
Zero-Day-Exploit Detection Honeypot capture every-
thing that is used against them, this means that also
unknown strategies and zero-day-exploits will be
identified.
Reduced False Positives and Negatives Any activity
with server-honeypots is an anomaly, which is by
definition an attack. Client-honeypots verify attacks
by detecting system state changes. These procedures
result in reduced false positives and false negatives.
Flexibility Honeypots are a very flexible concept as can
be seen by vast amount of different honeypot soft-
ware. This means, that well-adjusted honeypot tools
can be used for specific tasks, which furthermore
might reduce redundant load.
The disadvantages of honeypots include:
Limited Field of View Server-honeypots have one
common problem: they are worthless if no one
attacks them. As long as attackers do not send any
packets to the honeypot, it will be unaware of any
unauthorized activity on production systems.
Being Fingerprinted Low-interaction honeypots emu-
late services, that means that their services might
behave different than the real services, which can be
used for fingerprinting honeypots and consequently
detect them.
Risk to the Environment If honeypots get exploited,
they can introduce a risk into the user’s environ-
ment. As discussed, the higher the interaction level,
the higher the possible misuse.
III. HONEYPOT SOFTWARE
This chapter introduces honeypot software, classified
into the interaction level and their type of communication
architecture. This means that honeypots will be intro-
duced as either client or server honeypots and assigned
either as low or high with respect to their interaction
level. Hereby, this overview focuses on available and
deployable software as we hope that this will be help
the reader to choose the proper honeypot for his needs.
However, we also include outdated honeypot implemen-
tations that had a significant impact on the research and
were seminal during the release time. To clarify the state
of maintenance we explicitly note release dates. This
overview will not only illustrate how versatile honeypots
are but also in which different application scenarios it
can be deployed. Finally, we present honeypot related
tools as well as mechanisms that detect the presence of
honeypots.
A. Low Interaction Server Honeypots
1) Common Internet Services: The first publicly
available honeypot software was released in 1997, the
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Deception Toolkit(DTK) [31]. It is written in C and
Perl, and emulates vulnerabilities of well-known ser-
vices of Unix systems. The developers explain: “We
use deception to counter attacks [...] the deception is
intended to make it appear to attackers as if the system
running DTK has a large number of widely known
vulnerabilities.” [31].
In 1998, Back Officer Friendly (BOF) [32] was
developed, originally to notice attacks by the remote
administration tool Back Orifice. BOF has an outstand-
ing ease of use considering the early stages of this
research area, is runnable on Unix- and Windows based
systems, and provides an emulation for several well-
known services including Telnet, FTP, SMTP, POP3, and
IMAP2. The main objective of BOF is to waste the
time of intruders. Consequently, connection attempts are
merely logged and a plain response is created.
One year later the first commercial honeypot was
released: CyberCop Sting [33]. CyberCop Sting creates
a virtual network on a single host and simulates differ-
ent types of network devices, including Windows NT
servers, Unix servers, and routers. Each virtual network
device is connected to the Internet via a public IP
address. It thus can receive as well as send genuine-
looking packets. The simulated systems include decoys
for Telnet- and Nmap-based fingerprinting.
HoneyBOT [34] is a low-interaction honeypot for
Windows, which opens a range of roughly 1,000 lis-
tening sockets mimicking vulnerable services. The log
tool is quite sophisticated, as raw packet level data,
keystrokes, and malware (trojans, rootkits) are saved for
analysis. Furthermore, a report to a centralized collection
point via the syslog utility is optional. It is closely tied
with a GUI, which offers a classification of log events
based on port number or attacker IP address.
HoneyD [28] is one of the best-known and most sem-
inal honeypot implementation, in particular concerning
the virtualization of hosts. HoneyD is a small daemon
that simulates thousands of virtual hosts at the same time,
class B sized networks has been tested successfully. The
hosts can be configured to run arbitrary services, and
their fingerprint can be adapted so that they appear to be
running certain operating systems. Different operating
systems are simulated on the TCP/IP stack level by
learning TCP fingerprints from reading nmap/ xprobe
fingerprint files, which results in an effective deception
of these common tools. Not only hosts are simulated, but
also any arbitrary routing topology including dedicated
routes and routers. Moreover, the routes can be anno-
tated with latency and packet loss to improve realistic
characteristics of the topology. It is possible to ping or
to traceroute all virtual machines.
HOACD [35] bundles HoneyD, OpenBSD, and Arpd
on a bootable CD. The objective of HOACD is to provide
a ready to use honeypot system. It stores logs and
configuration files on a local hard disk.
Honeyperl [36] is a honeypot written completely
in Perl. Its prominent feature is the ability of being
extendable by Perl modules. Many plugins exist for
simulation of Telnet-sessions, SMTP etc.
Impost [37] is a network security auditing tool de-
signed to analyse the forensics behind compromised
and/or vulnerable daemons. Impost supports two modes:
It can either act as a low-interaction server honeypot,
which allows dynamic communication patterns by Perl
scripts; or it can operate as a packet sniffer and monitor
incoming data to pre-defined destination port. It is an
early honeypot implementation, which combines honey-
pots with full packet sniffing functionality.
KFSensor [38] is a Windows based commercial hon-
eypot. It is designed for deployment in a Windows based
corporate environment in order to improve the network
security of an organization. It includes IDS functionality
by (i) providing a Snort compatible signature engine, (ii)
emulating Windows networking protocols (e.g., NetBios)
and vulnerable system services or trojans. KFSensor
resists denial of service and buffer overflow attacks.
LaBrea [39] is the first honeypot incorporating the
tarpit techniques, sometimes described as sticky honey-
pots. LaBrea implement two functionalities. (i) It takes
over unused IP addresses by replying to unanswered
ARP requests in a network, and (ii) emulates hosts which
answer to SYN packets with a SYN/ACK. However,
LaBrea is not intended to support full TCP-connections.
When the attacker sends a TCP ACK and data packets,
LaBrea will not reply. Following TCP retransmission, the
attacker will be delayed as he waits for the TCP timeouts
and resends the data packets. LaBrea is a cross-platform
tool.
NetBait [40], [41] is a commercial solution that im-
plements honeypot farms. NetBait is available as a stand-
alone product or as a service. A redirector is deployed,
which forwards attacks on unused IP address ranges
either to predefined honeypots within the cooperate
network or to a honeypot farm which is maintained
by NetBait Inc. outside the network. Users of NetBait
only have to deploy a redirector in their networks, no
skilled network administrators and security specialists
are required, which saves costs. Moreover, NetBait is
described as a distributed query processing system on
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honeypot data, which has been collected by a set of
cooperating machines. NetBait supports up to 15,000
hosts per network. The company was offering their their
service from 2002 up to 2007.
NetFacade [42] is one of the very first commercial
low-interaction server honeypots, which simulates an
entire class C network with up to seven different op-
erating systems. Its development started in 1998 and
was released in 2000. However, it has seen little public
exposure. Its developer, Marty Roesch, gained valuable
knowledge and developed debug tools which led to the
development of Snort.
A simplistic honeypot server written in Perl is single-
honeypot [43], which was designed using the KISS-
principle. It logs access on all ports without emulating
services.
Smoke Detector [8] by Palisade Systems Inc. is
another early commercial product. It distinguishes itself
by not only providing a software but also offering a
hardware unit, which has Smoke Detector installed and
preconfigured. Smoke Detector mimics up to 22 services
and emulates 19 distinct hosts in a network. Access
attempts are reported. Complementary tools enable the
analysis of logs.
Specter [44] is one of the longest available commer-
cial products, being purchasable for 16 years, however
no new major release has been seen since 2005. It is
advertised as a smart honeypot-based intrusion detection
system and offers common Internet services such as
SMTP, FTP, POP3, HTTP, and TELNET. Furthermore,
Specter supports the analysis of ICMP, TCP, and UDP
packets on all ports. It logs malicious activities and
informs the administrator automatically. Specter provides
massive amounts of decoy content including images,
MP3 files, email messages, password files, documents,
and various types of software.
Also Symantec provided an extension to his anti-
malware products by selling the Symantec Decoy
Server [45]. This honeypot acts as a fully functioning
server, and can simulate email traffic between users in
the organization to mirror the appearance of a live mail
server. It records every action for further analysis.
Tiny Honeypot (thp) [46] is a simple server honeypot
which listens on every TCP port not currently in legiti-
mate use, logging all activities, and providing enough
replies and interaction to fool most automated attack
tools by a short fingerprint. The goal is to distract the
attackers from real services by offering a large amount
of open ports with fake services. Netfilter / iptables rules
are used to redirect any incoming connection requests to
the thp listener. By default a login banner and root shell
including some simple emulation of tools such as wget
are provided. Thp can reside on production hosts with
negligible impact on performance.
Nepenthes [47], [48] is a low interaction honeypot,
which is designed to emulate vulnerabilities that worms
misuse to spread, and to capture these worms. Nepenthes
provides a modular architecture which can be easily ex-
tended to add new vulnerabilities. Other modules include
functions such as the download of files, submitting of
the downloaded files, and a shellcode handler. Albeit
Nepenthes needs expert knowledge to emulate new vul-
nerabilities and to conduct a successful conversation with
malware, it captures new exploits for old vulnerabilities.
Unknown exploits are highlighted in the log files, an
information which can be used to build new modules or
better dialogues to trigger more downloads.
Dionaea [49] is meant to be a Nepenthes successor
overcoming some of its shortcomings such as missing
IPv6 support, multi-threading, TLS encryption for some
protocols, and switching from C++ to Python as the
module scripting language in hope of more contributors.
The shellcode detection was extended by developing
libemu [50], which detects shellcode not only by simple
pattern matching but by emulation. The libemu library
receives a buffer and detects even unknown shellcode
fully automatically. Moreover, Nepenthes never sup-
ported port 445 (SMB) because of too many different
exploitable vulnerabilities, Dionaea addresses this prob-
lem by emulating valid SMB sessions. Despite all the
improvements, it is worth noting that Dionaea is not
an extension of the Nepenthes code base, but rather the
same developers based their implementation on the the
Nepenthes architecture.
Honeytrap [51] is a low-interaction honeypot dae-
mon which distinguishes itself from other honeypots by
implementing a dynamic server concept. It uses stream
monitors to check the network stream for incoming
packets and starts appropriate listeners on demand. Each
listener can handle multiple connections and terminates
after some idle time. This concept targets completely
unknown attacks which might occur on random ports
and unknown protocols—no predefined emulation is
required. Service emulation is not the main focus, how-
ever some basic emulation is provided. If no emulation
for a protocol exists, the default response is a single
newline character, which, according to the developer, is
a simple but surprisingly successful approach. Honeytrap
distinguishes strictly between data capture, which is
implemented by the core system, and attack analysis,
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which is implemented by plugins. Honeytrap supports
several modes, including a mirror mode, which replies
with exactly the same packets as received, hence emu-
lating services implicitly. If the connection fails, default
replies are used. Furthermore, Honeytrap can be used in
proxy mode (also called meta-honeypot), which relays
incoming connections to other hosts or services while
still logging the communication. If ports are configured
in the ignore mode, honeytrap simply does not handle
those ports.
Mwcollect [52], later known as Mwcollectd [53],
is designed as a versatile malware collection daemon,
attempting to combine the best features of Nepenthes
and Honeytrap. Mwcollect was actively developed during
2005-2006 and received a major update in 2009 after
a long time of non-maintenance. Its entire functional-
ity is based on modules, which include libcurl for
HTTP and FTP downloads, TFTP, dynserv-nfqueue
module, which implements the Honeytrap principle of
package mirroring and dummy newline replies, as well
as some Dionaea bindings, HTTP/SMB emulation, shell-
code emulation via Libemu and mwserv, which is the
malware aggregation/submission service used by the
mwcollect Alliance.
2) Dedicated SMTP Honeypots: The Simple Mail
Transfer Protocol (SMTP) [54] defines an Internet proto-
col for sending emails. Mail Exchangers between email
sender and receiver are usually determined via the DNS
MX record. SMTP honeypots may thus operate either
independently of a DNS domain name, or linked to a
specific domain name using this record.
Jackpot [55] is an SMTP relay honeypot to combat
email spam. It is written in Java and comes with several
configuration options to make trapping and tracking of
spam as efficient as possible. Spam is automatically
classified by (i) using various antispam databases, (ii)
automatic distinction between regular spam or relay test
messages, and (iii) simulation of a very slow server
by delaying replies. Jackpot assumes advanced attackers
that try to detect honeypots by sending test messages
to their own email inbox. To tackle honeypot detection,
Jackpot delivers relay test messages to the inbox of
the attacker but silently drops messages to inboxes
of potential victims. All spam messages and client IP
addresses are logged. Jackpot provides a HTML GUI
for easy usage.
SpamD [56] is an email honeypot developed by
the OpenBSD community. It handles three types of
hosts: blacklisted hosts, white-listed hosts, and grey-
listed hosts. Blacklisted hosts are forwarded to SpamD
and tar-pitted, i.e., the communication is manipulated
with delays of 1 character per second during the com-
plete dialogue, to waste time of the attackers. Eventually
emails are rejected with an error message. A blacklisted
host will never be able to talk to a real mail server. In
contrast to this, connection attempts of white-listed hosts
are sent to a real mail server. New hosts are grey-listed
by default and forwarded to SpamD, which shows a
temporary failure message when they try to deliver mail.
Additionally, grey-listed hosts will experience stutter
during the first seconds of the dialogue. The objective
behind this artificial delay is to disturb spammers that are
paid for emails per minute. Those host will lose interest
and thus may be identified as attacker. It is worth noting
that a real mail, which prioritize quality of service, will
try to retransmit for a period of time. SpamD is a lot
more efficient compared to simple DNS lookups or spam
blacklist checks.
Another historic SMTP honeypot, which does not have
an official homepage any more and was not maintained
for many years, is ProxyPot [57]. It imitates an open
proxy mail relay and is designed to solely log spam and
record the sender identity.
Another simple SMTP honeypot is SMTPot [58],
which is written in Python in less than 300 lines of code.
Being a simple program it pretends to be an open mail
relay and collects emails in mailbox files.
Spamhole [59] is another fake open mail relay. It
accepts any email messages that the client sends to it,
however, rather than actually delivering the messages, it
will silently drop them.
Spampot [60] is a Jackpot clone. In contrast to
Jackpot, Spambot is written in Python. Its author aimed
at a higher support of different platforms. Spampot does
not use any heuristics to rate mails, it simply stores 5%
of the incoming spam.
3) Dedicated SSH Honeypots: Originally developed
in 1995, the Secure Shell (SSH) specifies a protocol
for secure remote login [61]. Today, SSH also supports
tunneling and forwarding [62]. As such it is used in
various application scenarios, e.g., secure copy.
Kojoney [63] is one of the very first dedicated low-
interaction SSH honeypots. Kojoney2 [64] is a major
extension of the Kojoney code base, which was refined,
expanded, and adjusted based on long-term deployment
experiences of Kojoney. Due to the popularity of another
SSH honeypot, Kippo, Kojoney2 incorporates many its
most attractive features while still retaining the Kojoney
core.
Kippo [65] is designed to log brute force attacks and
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the entire shell interaction performed by the attacker.
It provides a fake file system resembling Debian Linux
with the ability to add and remove files. Some basic tools
such as cat are integrated, however, they are configured
to delude the attacker. Moreover, session logs are stored
in an UML compatible format, so that they can be
replayed with the original timings of the prompt. Kippo
development has been continued by Cowrie [66], which
has already extended the software by SFTP/SCP support
and additional commands for example. Originally, Kippo
was inspired by Kojoney. All three SSH honeypots are
written in Python and utilize bash scripts.
4) Special HTTP and Web Honeypots: Glastopf [67]
is a modern, easy to deploy low-interaction web server.
This honeypot tool collects information about web
application-based attacks such as local and remote file in-
clusion or SQL injections. Furthermore, Glastopf down-
loads files from links that are included in incoming
requests and tries to respond such that the expectations
of the attacker is satisfied and subsequent attacks are
initiated. Glastopf promotes itself by implementing a
vulnerability type emulation instead of specific vulnera-
bility emulation. Once a vulnerability type is emulated,
unknown attacks of the same type can be handled. While
the implementation may be tedious, on the long-term
operators benefit from this abstraction.
HoneyWeb by Kevin Timm [8], [68] is a HTTP-only
low-interaction honeypot compatible with HoneyD. Hon-
eyWeb emulates various web server platforms, such as
Apache, Netscape, and Microsoft IIS. HoneyWeb looks
at incoming URL requests, identifies which platform they
suit, and finally deceives intruders by emulating specific
HTTP headers. To complicate the detection of the hon-
eypot, HoneyWeb supports the dynamic assignment of a
web server platform and an attacker for a certain time
frame. If the same attacker makes a UNIX-style request,
which is then followed by a Windows-style request,
HoneyWeb will deliver an error page. HoneyWeb is
extensible by SSL.
Elasticsearch is a search server based on Lucene and
provides a distributed full-text search engine with an
HTTP web interface and schema-free JSON documents.
It became the most popular enterprise search engine
which led to new attacks for that service. That is why
elastichoney [69] has been developed. It is a simple
Elasticsearch honeypot designed to catch attackers ex-
ploiting remote code execution vulnerabilities in the
Elasticsearch service. It is distributed as a ready-to-
deploy Docker file.
Google Hack Honeypot (GHH) [70] was introduced
in 2005, in order to combat search engine hackers.
Those attackers carefully craft search terms (e.g., title,
body text, filetype) to explore vulnerable websites, us-
ing search engines. For example, "# -FrontPage-"
inurl:service.pwd will search for web pages
that have been created with a misconfigured FrontPage
HTML editor. The search term will reveal user names
and passwords, which will give login credentials to the
corresponding web servers. GHH was used to learn
more about this threat by emulating a vulnerable web
application referenced by a transparent hyperlink, which
is hidden from common page viewers but is found using
a crawler.
Honey Accounts [71] is the first honeypot frame-
work to monitor the activity of compromised webmail
accounts. The honeypot consists of Gmail accounts in
combination with Google Apps Scripts to perform time-
triggered and event-triggered tasks. The scripts inform
the honeypot operator when an email was read, sent,
or starred, by sending status messages to a separate
email address under the control of the operator. To make
cybercriminals aware of the honey accounts, the operator
needs to leak account credentials (e.g., on paste sites).
5) Telephone Honeypots: Sandtrap [57] is a historic
honeypot, which addresses the problem of war dialing, a
technique of using a modem to automatically scan a list
of telephone numbers in search for computer systems.
Sandtrap can log incoming calls of up to 16 lines and
emulate reachable modems by answering with login
prompts. The caller ID (phone number) and any login
attempts are logged, moreover an alert system warns
administrators of suspicious activity in real time.
As the telephone-infrastructure is shifted towards the
voice over IP (VoIP), this service is increasingly under
attacks, which is why recent honeypot analysis concen-
trate around VOIP [72]. Artemisa [73] is a pure VoIP
SIP-specific honeypot implementation. It registers multi-
ple SIP accounts, which do not represent real human sub-
scribers, at one or more VoIP service providers, and waits
for incoming attacks. It includes conversation recording,
a protection against message flooding, correlation rules
to infer sequential and stateful attacks as well as rule-
based fingerprinting of known SIP attack tools.
6) Wireless, Mobile, and Bluetooth Honeypots: Phys-
ical and virtual honeypots have been studied in de-
tail [74], however, there is only little work in the field of
mobile or wireless related honeypots. Mobile honeypots
have to be distinguished from wireless honeypots, which
focus on the attacks on the wireless technology. The term
mobile honeypot usually refers to honeypots that focus
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on attacks on mobile devices.1 They can either be mobile
themselves in running on the mobile device, or they run
on common stationary hardware (e.g., desktops) that is
connected to a network of a mobile operator [76], [77].
The first class of approaches may complicate the mea-
surement across different types of systems. In addition,
they are only required if the hardware characteristics are
relevant for the study.
Mobile honeypots in the sense of honeypots focussing
on mobile devices are for example developed by the
Chinese Chapter of the Honeynet Project [78]. They are
using prototype deployments of honeypots for Bluetooth,
WiFi, and MMS.
FakeAP [79] was developed as a proof of concept at
the Def Con X 2002 hacking conference and introduced
wireless honeypots. The key task of FakeAPs is to
deceive attackers, not to log their actions, as it rapidly
generates 802.11b beacon frames with random ESSID,
BSSID (MAC), and channel assignments. This approach
hides ones own access point from plain sight and con-
fuses wardriving tools such as Kismet and NetStumbler.
TJ OConnor and Ben Sangster built honeyM [80], a
framework for virtualized mobile device client honey-
pots, which emulates in particular wireless technologies.
The bluetooth honeypot bluepot [81] was developed
to capture attacks on bluetooth devices. It is designed
designed to accept and store any malware sent to it and
to interact with common bluetooth attacks such as Blue
Bugging and Blue Snarfing. This honeypot does not re-
quire any specific device, it is written in Java and runs on
any Linux machine, but it does obviously demand from
the user to possess at least 1 active bluetooth interface.
This honeypot has also some graphical dashboard which
allows monitoring of attacks and presents some simple
graphs and lists.
HoneySpot [82] summarizes the concepts of a
Honeypot and wireless hotspot. It offers 802.11 wifi
access with the objective of being proved, attacked, or
compromised. It focuses on pure layer 2 wireless attacks
that exploit weaknesses in the wireless technology, in
particular subverting deployed security mechanisms.
In contrast to HoneySpot, [76] was designed to ex-
plore IP-level attacks on mobiles. The authors deploy
common honeypot tools (Kippo, Glastopf, and Dianaea)
on a standard Linux PC that is connected to an UMTS
1Note that the term “mobile honeypot” is also used to describe
other scenarios. Balachander Krishnamurthy [75] uses it to describe
prefixes of darknet address space that (1) are advertised to upstream
ASes, making the information mobile, and (2) change aperiodically,
moving the darknet in the address space.
network.
HoneyDroid [83] is a prototype of a honeypot es-
pecially designed to run on mobile Android devices.
For this purpose the Android smartphone has to be
rooted and extended by Galoula, which makes common
UNIX (BusyBox) services and file systems available
on Android. This step makes the installation of Kippo
and Honeytrap possible. Kippo has been adjusted to
resemble the behaviour of the Android OS. Furthermore,
an Android app is included, which reads and visualizes
the different log file results and transmits them eventually
to a centralized data collection point.
7) IoT Honeypots: The Internet of Things (IoT) is
the network of physical devices. In terms of hardware
and software, the IoT is not well-defined. Devices usu-
ally range from smartphones down to very constrained
embedded hardware with network connectivity [84]. As
those devices can be queried and controlled remotely,
attacks on those devices emerged. IoTPOT [85] was
used by a research team to analyze the increasing threats.
It analyzes Telnet-based attacks against various IoT
devices running on different CPU architectures such as
ARM, MIPS, and PPC. Another proof of concept in
this field is honeypot-camera [86], which emulates an
openly accessible webcam, including some fake images
and device specific deceptions such as watermarks and
daylight intensity.
The honeypot Shockpot [87] is designed around a sin-
gle, critical vulnerability called Shellshock/ CVE-2014-
6271 [88] for the bash shell. As the vulnerability was
very far-reaching, the study of its exploitation became
interesting. The pure python implementation emulates a
Apache-server, that appears to processes trailing strings
after function definitions in the values of environment
variables. This allowed remote attackers to execute ar-
bitrary code via a crafted environment in the original
vulnerability.
8) ICS/SCADA Honeypots: Another possible deploy-
ment place for honeypots are SCADA or ICS systems,
which are systems that monitor and control industrial
processes in the physical world, often such systems are
part of critical infrastructures and therefore particularly
endangered. Conpots [89] goal is to collect intelligence
about the motives and methods of adversaries targeting
industrial control systems. It is written in Python and
speaks several common Internet protocols such as HTTP,
but also some ICS-specific protocols such as kamstrup,
BACnet, and mosbus.
HoneyPoint [90] is a honeypot which comes in
several license versions and provides several sub-tools
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(HPPE, HPSS, HPSC, HPNTA) because of commercial
reasons. Its target platform is Windows. HoneyPoint
offers fake network services and web applications, in-
cluding manipulated documents which allow for tracking
down an attacker every time the document is opened
after the download. Furthermore, emulated devices in
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) such as SCADA are
supported.
9) Further Special Purpose Honeypots:
HoneySink [91] is a honeypot which specializes
on sinkholing. This allows security researchers to
monitor the communication within a botnet and to
prevent interaction between bots and their command
and control servers. HoneySink allows its user to
sinkhole any number of domains to it and configure
the emulation of DNS, HTTP, FTP, IRC on a basis of
protocol-domain combinations. The authors envision
two main use cases: First, deployment in internal
networks where self-maintained DNS servers redirect
traffic to known blacklisted URLs to HoneySink.
This helps to detect infected machines within your
own networks. Second, HoneySink can be configured
globally to respond by its own DNS functionality to
requests for domains which have been taken over by
law enforcement. This prevents criminals to maintain
control over their bots. HoneySink is the first freely
distributed network sinkhole software, which aims
for being a generic framework for analysing various
botnets.
B. High Interaction Server Honeypots
Argos [92] was released in 2006 and as it is based on
Qemu, it focuses on efficient x86 emulation. A high-
interaction honeypot environment is provided, which
aims to automatically identify and produce remedies for
zero-day exploits. Upon attack detection an intelligent
process- or kernel-aware logging is executed, further-
more own forensics shellcodes are injected allowing in-
depth analysis. Argos distinguishes itself by applying
memory tainting and creating signatures for intrusion
detection systems with very few false-positives. There
is also a support for running as a client honeypot (using
the same infrastructure as the Shelia client honeypot),
however this mode became neglected.
Honeywall [93] aims at making honeypot deploy-
ments simple and effective. This CentOS-based live-CD
utilizes Sebek as the dedicated honeypot software and
offers a GUI for system configuration, administration,
and data analysis. It features an architecture that allows
you to deploy both low-interaction and high-interaction
honeypots, but is designed primarily for high-interaction.
High Interaction Honeypot Analysis Tool (HI-
HAT) [94], [95] transforms arbitrary PHP applications
into web-based high interaction honeypots in an auto-
mated fashion. HIHAT has been compatible with 4 major
PHP frameworks during its active development time.
Furthermore HIHAT offers a graphical user interface
which enables honeypot monitoring and analysing the
acquired data. Extensive statistics are generated and IP
addresses are mapped to a geographic locations. Auto-
matic malware is attracted by insertion of transparent
links. Attack types, which has been spotted with HIHAT
include command injection, file inclusion and bot self-
propagation and are characterized by the HTTP GET re-
quest, the four different arrays provided by PHP, and the
data transferred. The tool automatically filters for attack
patterns via regular expression which were derived from
an analysis of known attacks against web applications.
HoneyBow Sensor [96] is based on VMWare im-
ages and consists of the following 3 components: The
MwWatcher malware collection tool, which monitors
file system changes in real time and catches potential
malware on a Win32 guest system. MwFetcher malware
collection tool, which extracts potential malware from
a VMware virtual disk by comparing the infected file
list with the clean file list. Finally, the MwSubmitter
malware submit tool, which submits potential malware
samples collected by MwWatcher and MwFetcher to the
mwcollect Alliance. The host tools are Linux based.
Infected guests can be replaced with clean guests au-
tomatically after malware extraction.
Sebek [97], [98] is a kernel module installed on high
interaction honeypots, usually virtual guest machines, for
the purpose of capturing attacker’s activities such as as
keystrokes or file uploads on Win32 and Linux systems.
It works by monitoring system call activity and recording
data of interest and is based on two components: The
client, which runs on the honeypots, captures activities
and sends the data to the second component, the server,
as stealthy as possible. The client masquerades its exis-
tence by using early root-kit techniques. The server is the
centralized data collection point for all honeypots within
the network.
Implementation such as Canarytokens [99] show that
honeypots are not necessarily computers, they can also
be computer resources, which are called honeytokens
[100]. Honeytokens are an URL, domain, word or PDF
document, Bitcoin wallet etc. an adversary might access.
An access usually indicates a system breach and hence
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will trigger a message to the admin. Canarytokens is also
available as a pre-hosted service [101], which minimises
the deployment effort.
C. Low Interaction Client Honeypots
PhoneyC [102], [103] is a honeypot which mimics
legitimate web browsers and enables the study of ma-
licious HTTP pages. It features the interpretation of
remote links (hrefs, iframes etc. ) and scripting lan-
guages via spidermonkey. Moreover, specific ActiveX
and PDF vulnerabilities are emulated and heap spray
and shellcode detectors are included. By using dynamic
program analysis, PhoneyC removes obfuscation from
many malicious pages. Different browser identities are
supported. The data flow of PhoneyC is as followed: One
or more URLs are passed to the client, which retrieves
the content. The content is scanned by an anti-virus
program if it is a file. Valid HTML files are broken up
by script code languages and interpreted by the specific
engines. Alerts are risen on suspicious behaviour.
HoneyC [25], [104] is a honeypot which identifies
malicious servers on the web by using different visitor
clients, search schemes, and analysis algorithms. It con-
sists of three components: the visitor, the queuer, and the
analysis engine. The visitor interacts with the potentially
malicious servers, makes the requests and processes the
response. The queuer creates a queue of servers to visit.
Self-evidently, the analysis engine is the component
responsible to evaluate whether security policies have
been violated by deploying snort rule matching. All
modules use the pipe to communicate with each other.
Thug [105] is a pure Python honeypot and build upon
the experiences which were gathered by the development
of PhoneyC. It aims at mimicking the behaviour of a
web browser on a certain operating system in order to
detect malicious contents. Thug uses the Google V8
Javascript engine and an own DOM tree implementation.
This framework performs static syntax tree and dynamic
code analysis. Vulnerable modules are emulated like
ActiveX, Flash, Adobe Reader. Different personalities
exist, which include various Windows versions, Linux,
iOS, MacOS and Android but also multiple browsers
like Safari, Chrome or Internet Explorer. Proxies are
supported, which can be used to anonymize the access
to a malicious page by for example TOR.
YALIH [106], [107] (Yet Another Low Interaction
Honeyclient) is designed to detect malicious websites by
integrating a combination of multiple antivirus engines
and pattern matching using string or regular expres-
sions for detection. It is capable of extracting embedded
JavaScript files and performs de-obfuscation and de-
minification of scripts. IYalih has an IMAP plugin in,
which scans an email inbox for spam, extracts the
URLs and visit these sites. Its emulated browser handles
cookies and session, redirection, referrers and different
browser personalties. The developers compared its effec-
tiveness using a malware URL database and determined
15% less false negatives than Thug, 80% than HoneyC
and 35% than Monkey-Spider while still requiring only
a moderate scanning time.
SpyBye [108] is developed by the same author as
HoneyD, however it is a low interaction client honeypot.
Originally, one had to enter an URL into a form and wait
for the analysis to complete, similar to other honeypot
clients. However, SpyBye matured into an HTTP proxy,
which intercepts all browser requests while the user just
simply visits a homepage. SpyBye intends to determine
if embedded links on your web page are harmless,
unknown or even dangerous and scan the content against
the ClamAV engine. It is a reliable indication for a
compromise if administrators scan their homepages and
detect foreign URLs which were not set by them.
Monkey-Spider [9], [109] is a crawler based honey-
pot utilizing anti-virus solutions to detect malware. It is
claimed to be fast and expandable with other detection
mechanisms. It uses the well-known scalable Heritrix
crawler to create arc files and then pass them along to
anti-virus scanners such as ClamAV and Avast. Monkey-
Spider detection is done solely by external signatures.
URLs, binaries and malicious JavaScript are extracted
and saved in a threats database.
ADSandbox [110] is a honeypot which utilizes at its
core the Mozilla JavaScript engine SpiderMonkey within
a sandbox and logs every action during the execution.
After that a heuristic assesses malicious behaviour. The
heuristic performs static and dynamic analysis. The user
interacts with ADSandbox in two different methods:
First, by means of the browser helper objects, which
hands over the URLs visited within the browser to
the analysis engine and displays custom error pages if
necessary or in case of no suspicion lets the user visit
the page transparently. Second, the user can manually
supply an URL and some additional parameters using
the shell. ADSandbox is meant primarily to provide real-
time protection for browser users, hoever it never left the
prototype status.
D. High Interaction Client Honeypots
Capture Bat [111] monitors the state of the Win32
operating systems during the execution of applications
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and processing of documents. The client connects to a
central capture server that requests the client to visit an
URL with a specific browser. The client is run inside
of a virtual machine so that infections can be reverted
by resetting the virtual machine. Capture Bat provides
insights on how the software operates even if no source
code is available by observing state changes on a low
kernel level (by the help of a file system, registry and
process monitor). Event noise that naturally occurs in
an operating system environment while idling or on
standard execution of applications is filtered, allowing
analysts to easier spot and understand the behaviour of
for example malicious Microsoft Word documents.
HoneyClient [112], [113] is the first open source
client honeypot. It is state-based and detects attacks on
VMWare Windows clients running on Linux hosts by
monitoring files, process events, and registry entries. Its
architecture is threefold: An Agent, Manager and Util
Module exist. The agent component is a SOAP server,
running as a daemon within a cygwin environment on
the guest. It receives messages which trigger actions
like visiting a homepage with a specific web browser
(Internet explorer, firefox are supported) or performing
an integrity check of the Windows files. The manager
module handles the guests on the host system by com-
municating with the agents. The Util package provides
the SOAP/http protocol integration and a configuration
possibility.
Capture-HPC [114] is a honeypot framework de-
signed with efficiency and scalability in mind. Capture-
HPC consists of a Capture Server and Capture Client.
The Capture server is a simple server that manages vari-
ous capture clients and the VMware servers, which host
the guest OS that run the Capture clients. It distributes
each URL it receives to the active clients. The Capture
client consists of 2 modules: a kernel driver which
uses event-based detection mechanisms for monitoring
the system’s state changes (file system, registry, and
processes that are running) and an user space process,
which accepts action requests from the Capture server,
and communicates potential state changes back to the
server. An exclusion list is used to filter default events.
Strider HoneyMonkey [115], [116] was developed by
the Microsoft Research Team and distinguishes itself by
a narrow coupling with the Windows OS and by creating
heterogeneous virtual hosts, which differ by their patch
level. The technology was never provided publicly but
was used only for internal purposes. HoneyMonkey
utilizes the Internet Explorer as the Browser, however
does not allow any pop-ups or installation of plugins
or software. Any read or write which happens outside
of Internet Explores file directories are considered mali-
cious and highlighted for manual analysis. Furthermore,
new spawned child processes of the Internet Explorer
are observed. Upon detecting an exploit, the monkey
notifies the Monkey Controller on the host machine to
respawn a clean HoneyMonkey virtual machine, which
then continues to visit the remaining URLs.
Trigona [117] tries to improve the efficiency of high
interaction honeypot clients by combining the advantage
of high interaction where no emulation is used and low
interaction, where a high throughput and a small resource
fingerprint is possible. As opposed to other frameworks
Trigona does not load several VMs or resets one VM
repeatedly for each URL, but initiates one VM, which
access multiple, for example 200, URLs at once. The
network traffic is packet captured for analysis at a later
stage. The VM is reverted after a group of URLs. Exploit
Kits and Malware Binaries can then be extracted from
the packet captures files, the state information of the
operating system are not analysed.
HoneySpider [118] is hybrid honeypot framework,
which is based on fairly up-to-date high and low interac-
tion honeypot tools and integrates a crawler application
specially designed for the bulk processing of URLs. The
framework focuses primarily on attacks involving the use
of web browsers and their plug-ins by detecting drive-by
downloads and malicious binaries including 0-day ex-
ploits. HoneySpider automatically obtains and analyses
the malware. The first version included a simple web-
client, JavaScript analysis and Capture-HPC. It evolved
and possesses now a shellcode and anti-virus scanner;
PDF, SWF and office documents analyser, moreover
some bindings for Thug, Cuckoo and couchDB.
SHELIA [119] focuses on the analysis of URLs and
attachments received in emails. It supports IMAP/POP,
so it can read messages from an email in-box, however
direct input of links and files is also possible. SHELIAs
design philosophy is that false positives are much more
important than false negatives because they are possibly
more harmful in cases of signature creation, therefore
they are avoided. This is done by detecting intrusions
not by verifying modifications to the file system or
registry after visiting a website, but by tracking the
caller of sensitive operations. More precisely, whenever
a call modifies the registry, the file system, or network
activity, Shelia tracks whether the call is coming from
an unauthorized area which is not supposed to contain
code. Shelia runs in a virtual machine which is reset
every n checks to prevent infections to survive if they are
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not detected by Shelia. Upon exploit detection extensive
analysis and logging to a database takes place.
UW-Spycrawler [120] was used for research projects,
however never made publicly available as the authors
focussed on Internet research rather than developing
a general user-friendly framework. It focusses on the
detection of malware using one of the two attack meth-
ods: Piggy-backed malware code, which comes with
legitimately looking executables or drive-by download
attacks, which exploit a vulnerability in the browser to
install malware. UW-Spycrawler supports automatic soft-
ware installation by automatically accepting the EULA
and other installation steps. Piggy-backed spyware is
then recognized by using a signature-based anti-spyware
program (AdAware). Drive-by attacks are assumed to
escape the browser-sandbox and modify the system,
so URLs are marked as malicious if one of the event
triggers is detected, like file and registry writes, process
creation, browser crashes.
Web Exploit Finder (WEF) [121] is designed to de-
tect drive-by-download attacks and consists of a VMware
virtualization layer, specially crafted Windows guests
and an user dashboard which communicates with the
guests controls the action of the web browsers. Attacks
are detected by checking for modifications to the oper-
ating system by evaluating the relevant system calls. As
such changes to the operating system are not designated,
a deep integration and interaction with the kernel was
deployed by the so-called rootkit module.
HoneyIM [122] utilises Capture-HPC in a new con-
text. The open-source instant messaging (IM) client
Pidgin is used to extend the basic functionalities and
to create decoy IM users. A legitimate IM user has
to add the decoy IM user to its contact lists, if some
IM malware compromises and tries to propagate, it
will contact all users in the contact list, therefore the
decoy will also receive malicious URLs etc. and thus
will be registered by the HoneyIM system. Furthermore,
the malware can then be analysed in the Capture-HPC
environment. This helps to recognize infections in IM
networks early, as HoneyIM delivers attack information
to network administrators in real-time so that system
quarantine and recovery can be quickly performed.
PwnyPot [123] is a honeypot, which does not detect
malicious servers based on system changes but tries
to identify the malware already during the exploitation
stage, that means before any changes to the system or
infections have occurred. This approach makes recog-
nition of zero-day exploits easier as no signatures are
required. Supported programs include among others In-
ternet Explorer, Firefox, Office Products, Adobe Acrobat
Reader and Flash. The main features of PwnyPot are
general protections like heap spray mitigation and null
page allocation prevention, return oriented programming
(ROP) detection and ROP gadget dumps, moreover de-
tection of possible DEP and ASLR bypasses. Shellcode
is recognized and analysed dynamically. PwnyPot offers
bindings for Cuckoo, one of the leading open source
automated malware analysis systems, which can perform
an automatic analysis.
E. Honeypot Related Tools
The following tools extend the functionality of hon-
eypots or are meant to be used simultaneously with
honeypots, for example by making managing tasks easier
or detection executables automatically.
Bait-n-Switch [124] was not a honeypot technology
as such, however it was one of the first attempts to
multiplex hostile and regular traffic between production
systems and honeypots. It is a system which reacts to
malicious intrusion attempts by redirecting all hostile
traffic to a honeypot. Bait-n-Switch is realized by as a
Snort extension, based on linux’ iproute2 and netfilter.
The honeypot software can be chosen arbitrarily. The
same developers also developed a low-interaction hon-
eypot called BigEye [8], which only emulated FTP and
HTTP services.
Honeynet Security Console (HSC) [125] is an anal-
ysis tool to view events on your personal honeynet.
It focuses on visualization and grouping of of events
from Snort, TCPDump, Firewall, Syslog and Sebek log
files. Moreover, it correlates information between those
different log file types, so that analysis can be done with
a more holistic approach.
GSOC-Honeyweb [126] manages client honeypots
via a user-friendly web interface. This application is
threefold: The front-end, providing a standardized in-
terface for various client honeypots; a business layer,
communicating with a Java wrapper and a back-end, pro-
viding the data persistence to collect, store and aggregate
client honeypot results. GSOC-Honeyweb should not be
confused with HoneyWeb by Kevin Timm [8], [68].
Honeysnap [127] is a diagnostic tool which can
be used to perform a number of diagnostics on data
which was collected by a server honeypot. The primary
intention is to provide an analysis on a directory full of
pcap data. It decodes and analyses a variety of protocols
supporting: outgoing packet counts and binary extraction
for telnet, ssh, http, https, ftp, smtp, and IRC; incom-
ing and outgoing connection summaries; word based
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inspection of IRC traffic for basic keyword profiling. In
addition, it focuses on honeypot specific data sets such
as Sebek keystroke data.
PE Hunter [128] is a plugin for snort for extracting
Windows portable executables from the network stream
and is meant to be used in front of honeypots, which
trigger the transfer of the executables. It works by
spotting a PE header, using a simple heuristik to calculate
the file length and finally dumping the corresponding
bytes to a file.
HoneyMole [129] incorporates Capture-HPC and sup-
ports administrators to deploy and distribute sensors
worldwide which tunnel traffic in a transparent way
to a centralized farm of honeypots. Sensors can be
understood as simple, encrypted ethernet bridges over
TCP/IP. The idea here is that sensors require minimal
maintenance efforts, which saves time for administrators.
Moreover, data about attacks is collected in one point,
which saves time for analysts.
TraCINg [130] can be described as a cyber incident
monitor, which can receive data from arbitrary honeypots
as long as it is well-structured with JSON. Currently,
only a Dionaea-plugin exists. TraCINg collects data from
several honeypot sensors and tries to correlate attacks
in order to find emerging worm outbreaks. It considers
mutual attack sources as well as timing properties in its
analysis.
F. Honeypot Detection Tools
Not only do tools exist which extend the functionality
but rather are adversaries of honeypots: honeypot detec-
tion tools. This class of tools is able to detect low- as
well as high-interaction honeypots.
Low-interaction honeypots are detectable because of
the service emulation, which will never be able to behave
like the real service because of the nature of emulation
and security concerns. This means that specific actions
trigger different responses, as has been shown for ex-
ample for Kippo and OpenSSH [131]. Specially crafted
messages trigger a characteristic response, which often
contains a specific string or number, often called magic
numbers. This magic number identifies Kippo. Nmap
also detects some of the Dionaea services as being part
of the honeypot and string obfuscation is necessary to
overcome the signature-based detection [130].
High-interaction honeypots use real services in con-
straint environments, therefore fingerprinting them is
based on detection of unusual additional libraries or
debuggers and characteristics of virtualization software
[132]. Holz [133] presented several techniques, for ex-
ample VMware uses only a specific range of MAC-
addresses for its virtual network interfaces, chroot and
jail environments are fingerprintable by special ls calls
and even the presence of debuggers such as ptrace
can be detected by simple system calls. It has been
shown with the help of a timing analysis, that honeypots,
especially those running in virtualized environments,
respond slower than real services [134]. This fact could
also be used for detection, however has to be used with
caution as the response time is also highly dependant
on other factors like network load, routing etc. . Zou
[135] and Wang [136] demonstrated that botnets can
be designed to be aware of honeypots. Their work is
based on the following assumption: Honeypots must not
participate in real (or too many real) attacks because of
legal constraints. Attackers can detect honeypots in their
botnet by verifying whether the compromised machines
can successfully send out unmodified malicious traffic to
attackers’ sensors. Sebek was detectable by the relative
address space positions of the write() and read() calls,
as the integration of Sebek positions these two farther
away from each other [137]. This approach of verifying
address space positions is used even today but for
different elements, for example the interrupt descriptor
table register (IDTR) [138].
G. Summary of Honeypot Software
An overview of available honeypot software, its clas-
sification, and publication details is shown by Table III
and Table IV. One of the first findings is that different
honeypots exist which are applied to different protocols
and network types. This higlights the universality of the
concept of honeypots. Another finding is that certain
honeypot software overlap in their field of operation. In
this cases, the quality and maintenance life time of the
honeypot influence the success.
Despite many different honeypots and related tools,
the general trend is clear: Simple proof of concepts
developed into complex honeypot tools which are de-
signed to be deployed for a long time. As the intended
analysis is getting more complex, management (e.g.
GSOC-Honeyweb, Vagrant) and analysis tools (TraC-
INg) emerge and even combinations with intrusion and
malware detection tools are considered (see subsec-
tion II-A, subsection III-E).
Table III clarifies that the first honeypot and also
the majority of available honeypot software are low-
interaction server honeypots. The reason for this obser-
vations might be the fact, that on the one hand server
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honeypots require less implementation effort than client
honeypots as they do not have to have a sophisticated
crawler engine and on the other hand the emulation of
services requires less maintenance effort than providing
real services on high-interaction honeypots. This circum-
stance led to the situation, that many developer initially
released small proof of concept honeypots, which should
just introduce the concept. Hence, such honeypots (e.g.
BOF, single-honeypot) had a rather short maintenance
life time. After the approval of the honeypots effective-
ness, reliable deployment was necessary, which led to
more complex honeypots which were longer maintained
(e.g. HoneyD, SpamD). The nowadays broadly applied
state-of-the-art honeypots (Kippo, Nepenthes-Dionaea,
Honeytrap) distinguish themselves with long mainte-
nance life times. Such life times decrease deployment
efforts for administrators and foster the development
of community based plugins. However, it is difficult
to determine if the the long development life time is
responsible for success of those tools or vice versa.
Another general trend is also the focus on the service,
low-interaction server honeypot tend to either specialize
in the emulation of on one or a few well-known services,
or simply perform default answers on all ports. It is also
noticeable, that high-interaction server honeypots were
developed later and only few exist - Sebek and Argos
has been here predominant. Although being a mere data
capture tool designed to capture attacker’s activities,
Sebek has to be highlighted for its pioneering influence.
However, only Argos has received recent updates for
newer version of Windows. One of the reasons of Argos
success might be its modern memory taint analysis,
which is is very good in the detection of recent attack
types (compare subsection V-J).
As shown by Table IV, client honeypots appeared
almost 5 years later than server honeypots. Client hon-
eypots mimic the behaviour of users in order to rate
the risk imposed by the Internet, therefore the list of
emulated and examined software consists of common
www-technologies such as browsers and their plugins,
Flash or PDF viewers (Browsers are the primary user
interfaces to the World Wide Web and because of
that arguably the most frequently used program by the
common user). As this complex browser environments
are more difficult to emulate, we see the ratio of high
and low honeypots shift towards high-interaction hon-
eypots. Client-honeypot rather implement less services
than server-honeypots, however this is completely le-
gitimate, as client honeypots actively influence which
application are required. As client honeypots do not
improve the security of production networks directly,
low-interaction client honeypots usually are published
in the context of Internet-wide research of several years
(HoneyC, Monkey-Spider, PhoneyC etc). This is why
this type of software has relatively long maintenance
time compared to server honeypots. Besides the complete
emulation of services the current trend in low-interaction
client honeypots is the performance, so that a larger and
faster view of the Internet is possible (Thug, YALIH).
Another difference to server honeypots can be observed:
For client honeypots, low as well as high interaction
honeypots appeared at the same time. Furthermore,
high-interaction client and server honeypots appeared
almost at the same time. HoneyClient is the first high-
interaction client honeypot and stands out with his long
maintenance. However, it should not be deployed any
more as the only currently maintained honeypot (even
with an highly scalable associated project network) is
HoneySpider.
This overview is limited to the classification, mainte-
nance time and the focus on services, software architec-
ture and its application area. Although this properties are
already enough to assess the deployability to a specific
scope, future work might consider more quality measures
such as robustness, quality of collected data and its ease
of analysis, actual containment and detection precision.
However, an elaborated long-term deployment test of
each honeypot would be necessary, hence it is recom-
mended to narrow down the choice by the presented
overview.
IV. LONG-TERM HONEYPOT PROJECTS
This section introduces long-term honeypot projects
and meta-projects, which are responsible for the creation
and publication of significant honeypot software, data
and several research papers. Rather short projects and
honeypot deployments are not enlisted here, but consid-
ered in the next section which presents metrics used in
the field of honeypot data analysis.
The first honeypot project was the Honeynet Project,
which started off in 1999 and released a paper series
which has been combined in the well-known book Know
Your Enemy [139]. This project focuses on investigating
the latest attacks and is developing open source security
tools to improve internet security, recently also at the
Google Summer of Code. Its chapters are spread out
around the world and use different tools to collect
informations, based on the needs client/server and low-
/high-interaction honeypots are used. The project is still
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Table III
CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION OF SERVER HONEYPOT SOFTWARE BY THEIR INTERACTION LEVEL TYPE. (+)
INDICATES SOME ADDITIONAL SERVICES, (++) INDICATES MANY ADDITIONAL SERVICES, (*) MARKS VAGUE TIMESTAMPS.
Ty
pe Software
Maintenance Free Focus
First Last Services / Applications Design / Details
DTK [31] 1997 1999 3 SMB, SSH, DNS, FTP, Netstat(++) implement many known vulnerabilities
BOF [32] 1998 1999 3 Back Orifice, Telnet, SMTP(+) waste intruders time, easy deployment
NetFacade [42] 1998 2002* 8 not specified class C network emulation
CyberCop String [33] 1999 1999 8 Telnet, FTP, SendMail, SNMP emulating different network devices
Specter [44] 1999 2005 3 SMTP, FTP, HTTP and Telnet(+) commercial deployment, decoy files
Sandtrap [57] 2002* 2002* 8 dialup modem war dialing trapping
single-honeypot [43] 2002 2002 3 all ports, but no emulation mere logging, KISS architecture
HoneyWeb [68] 2002 2003 3 HTTP various web server header emulation
LaBrea [39] 2002 2003 3 all ports, but no emulation simple TCP tarpit by SYN/ACK
SMTPot [58] 2002 2003 3 SMTP spam accumulation, KISS
THP [46] 2002 2003 3 SSH (shell), HTTP, FTP coexistence honeypot and real services
Jackpot [55] 2002 2004 3 SMTP delay spam, utilizing spam databases
FakeAP [79] 2002 2005 3 802.11b AP beacons p.o.c wireless honeypots
HoneyBot [34] 2002* 2007* 3 SSH, SMTP, FTP, HTML(++) windows vulnerabilities and GUI
BigEye [8] 2003 2003 3 HTTP, FTP emulation of different web servers
Spamhole [59] 2003 2003 3 SMTP silent dropping of emails
Spampot [60] 2003 2003 3 SMTP platform independence
HoneyPerl [36] 2003 2003 3 HTTP, FTP, SMTP, Telnet(+) extensibility by modules
Decoy Server [45] 2003* 2003 8 SMTP, POP3 fake email server traffic
Smoke Detector [8] 2003* 2004* 8 FTP, HTTP, IMAP, SSH, SMB(++) honeypot as a hardware
NetBait [41] 2003 2007* 8 not specified honeypot as a service
HoneyD [28] 2003 2008 3 HTTP, POP3, SMTP, FTP(+) emulating heterogeneous networks
lo
w
KFSensor [38] 2003 2015 8 HTTP, SMTP, MSSQL, FTP(+) commercial deployment of honeypots
SpamD [56] 2003 2015* 3 SMTP tarpit against spam
HOACD [35] 2004 2004 3 compare HoneyD live bootable CD (HoneyD, Arpd)
ProxyPot [57] 2004* 2004* 3 SMTP email spammer identification
Impost [37] 2004 2004 3 all ports, but no emulation full packet sniffing
Kojoney [63] 2005 2006 3 SSH (shell activity) first dedicated SSH honeypot
Mwcollect [53] 2005 2009 3 compare Nepenthes, Honeytrap merging Nepenthes and Honeytrap
Nepenthes [47] 2005 2009 3 FTP, HTTP, TFTP, MSSQL(++) capture worm payload
GHH [70] 2005 2013 3 HHTP-Apache, PHP, MSSQL crawler and search engines
Honeytrap [51] 2005 2015 3 HTML, FTP(+), dyn. emulation attacks via unknown protocols
HoneyPoint [90] 2006 2014 8 not specified ICS/Scada, back tracking intruders
Dionaea [49] 2009 2013 3 SMB, FTP, SIP, MYSQL(++) nepenthes successor, capture payload
Kippo [65] 2009 2014 3 SSH (shell activity) emulate entire shell interaction
Artemisa [73] 2010 2011 3 VoIP, SIP Bluetooth Malware
bluepot [81] 2010 2015 3 Bluetooth Bluetooth Malware
HoneySink [91] 2011 2011 3 DNS, HTTP, FTP, IRC bot sink holing
HoneyDroid [83] 2011 2014* 3 compare Kippo, HoneyTrap p.o.c Android OS honeypot
Glastopf [67] 2011 2015 3 HTML, PHP, SQL web applications, vulnerability types
Kojoney2 [64] 2012 2015 3 SSH (shell activity) applying Kojoneys lessons learned
Conpots [89] 2013 2015 3 kamstrup, BACnet, mosbus ICS and SCADA architectures
IoTPOT [85] 2014* 2015 3 telnet IoT (ARM, MIPS, and PPC)
honeypot-camera [86] 2014 2015 3 HTTP Tornado Web, Webcam Server
Shockpot [87] 2014 2015 3 Apache, Bash Shellshock vulnerability
Cowrie [66] 2014 2015 3 SSH (shell activity) Kippos successor
Canarytokens [99] 2015 2016 3 URLs, bitcoin, PDF honeypot tokens
lo
w
elastichoney [69] 2015 2015 3 elasticsearch elasticsearch RCEs
Sebek [97] 2003 2011 3 Win32 and Linux systems attackers OS activities, state-based
Honeywall [93] 2005 2009 3 compare Sebek, CentOS live bootable CD
HoneyBow [96] 2006 2007 3 Win32 Systems extraction of malware, state-based
Argos [92] 2006 2014 3 Linux, Windows XP-7 0-day exploits identification, tainting
hi
gh
HIHAT [94] 2007 2007 3 php-BB,-Nuke,-Shell,-Myadmin PHP framework extension, state-based
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Table IV
OVERVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION OF CLIENT HONEYPOT SOFTWARE BY THEIR INTERACTION LEVEL TYPE. (+) INDICATES SOME
ADDITIONAL SERVICES, (++) INDICATES MANY ADDITIONAL SERVICES, (*) MARKS VAGUE TIMESTAMPS.
Ty
pe Software
Maintenance Free Focus
First Last Services / Applications Design / Details
HoneyC [104] 2004 2007 3 HTTP identify malicious servers with snort
SpyBye [108] 2007 2007 3 HTTP proxy, URL check by ClamAV
Monkey-Spider [109] 2007 2009 3 HTTP, JavaScript threat database creation, several AV
PhoneyC [103] 2007 2011 3 HTML, JavaScript, PDF, ActiveX(+) browser identities, dyn. analysis
ADSandbox [110] 2010 2010* 3 HTML, JavaScript transparent protection, stat/dyn. analysis
Thug [105] 2011 2015 3 HTML, JavaScript, PDF, Flash(+) complete emulation, stat/dyn. analysis
lo
w
YALIH [107] 2014 2015 3 HTML, JavaScript, (IMAP) precise by combining analysis methods
HoneyClient [112] 2004 2010 3 Windows (Firefox, IE) proof of concept, state-based
Capture-HPC [114] 2004 2009 3 Linux, Windows (Firefox, Office (+)) efficiency, scalability, state-based
UW-Spycrawler [120] 2005 2006* 3 Windows (IE) spyware detection, state-based
HoneyMonkey [115] 2005 2007* 8 Windows (IE) IE vulnerabilities, state-based
WEF [121] 2006 2007 3 Windows (IE) drive-by download attacks, state-based
Capture Bat [111] 2007 2007 3 Windows (Word, IE) state changes on a low kernel level
HoneyIM [122] 2007 2007* 3 compare Capture-HPC instant messaging
SHELIA [119] 2008 2009 3 Windows (IMAP, POP) email malware, call-tracing
Trigona [117] 2010 2010 3 Windows (Browsers) high throughput, —
HoneySpider [118] 2011 2015 3 Capture-HPC, THUG hybrid client honeypot framework
hi
gh
PwnyPot [123] 2013 2013 3 Windows (Browsers+Plugins) memory corruption, shellcode detection
alive and by far the largest honeypot association, which
comprises other smaller (regional) honeypot projects.
One of the very first large-scale worldwide honeypot
projects was launched by the Institut Eurocom in 2003
and is called the Leurre.com project. Its last publication
dates back to 2008 and describes the infrastructure and
the main insights. This project is based on a worldwide
distributed system of low-interaction honeypots present
in more than 30 countries. The main objective is to get
a more realistic picture of internet threats by collecting
unbiased quantitative data and create a long-term and
location-independent perspective. [2].
The European Network of Affined Honeypots, also
known as the NoAH-Project, is a project coordinated
by the Foundation for Research and Technology Hellas
(FORTH) and several European academic and business
partners. This three-year project gathered and analysed
internet attacks by deploying the high-interaction Hon-
eypot Argos. The aim was to help NRENs (National
Research and Education Networks) and ISPs (Internet
Service Providers) to limit damage to their networks and
to better assess threats. This project started in 2005 [140].
Deriving from the mwcollect development, the mw-
collect Alliance is a non-profit community aiming pri-
marily at malware collection. This closed community
deployed Nepenthes sensors on the internet. Analysis of
the data was performed on the Alliance’s server in real-
time. This project was mainly active from 2006 to 2009.
Members were chosen by a simple email verification,
however one of the requirements were frequent contri-
butions of new samples, that means active Nepenthes
sensors. Mwcollect alliance consisted of not evenly dis-
tributed sensors across European countries [141], [142].
Telekom-Fru¨hwarnsystem was first presented in
2013, however early cooperations with worldwide part-
ners started in 2012. From the beginning, this project
was based on a multi-honeypot platform. Initially, part-
ners had to set up the honeypots by themselves, by
this time T-Pot exists, which combines common open-
source low-interaction server honeypot tools (dionaea,
glastopf, kippo, honeytrap) and reduces the maintenance
for partners. Furthermore, the project is now open for
uncertified contributors, however this data and its analy-
sis are marked and separated as the community data set
[143].
An overview of the various honeypot projects is shown
in Table V.
V. HONEYPOT DATA ANALYSIS
In the following, we describe the process of analysing
honeypot data in a step-by-step manner by means of
analysis questions, which gives an overview about dif-
ferent methods and metrics in the field of honeypot data
analysis.
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Table V
OVERVIEW OF LONG-TERM HONEYPOT PROJECTS AND ALLIANCES.
Project Topology Begin Duration
Honeynet Project [139] Multi-Honeypot Platform 1999 ongoing
Leurre.com [2], [144] HoneyD Sensors 2003 5 years
NoAH-Project [140] Argos Sensors 2005 3 years
mwcollect Alliance [141] Nepenthes Sensors 2006 3 years
Telekom-Fru¨hwarnsystem [143] Multi-Honeypot Platform 2012 ongoing
The deployment of honeypots creates log records
which describe the occurred incidents. The possible
incidents are dependant on the type of honeypot de-
ployed. Therefore it is important to define the problem
statement that should be investigated before the actual
deployment. If honeypots should look actively for com-
munication partners, a client honeypot has to be used,
a server honeypot otherwise. If we rather investigate
meta-information of protocols and transactional data for
specific services, low-interaction honeypots are the right
choice. High-interaction honeypots should be used, if
content, shellcode execution and the integrity of the oper-
ating system are of concern. A single problem statement
can be answered by various metrics, each with its own
approach and accuracy.
Hence, the overview in this section will follow the
presented honeypot classification and will be additionally
divided into problem statements and the associated met-
rics. However, this section depicts merely metrics used
in data analysis, performance metrics which are usually
applied to benchmark a honeypot are not described, as
they are mostly self-explanatory and just measure CPU,
RAM, HDD load or scalability.
In general, no research presents any in-depth honeypot
data analysis before the year 2004. Prior to this, analysis
consisted of mining IDSs alarms. However, IDSs can
only be seen as complementary analysis tool. Honeypots
can bring more information than simply provided by
IDSs, especially if static signature based IDSs are used
[145].
A. Attack Profile
McGrew [146] suggested that an attack profile which
provides useful information about an honeypot attack
should contain information about the following at-
tributes:
Motivation Motivation describes the reason of the at-
tack.
Breadth/Depth The breadth of the attack is described
by the number of machines affected and the depth
is the degree to which a specific target was analysed
or how large the impact of the attack was on the
system.
Sophistication Sophistication characterises the level of
expertise required to perform a specific attack.
Concealment Concealment measures the quality of hid-
ing the evidence of the attack.
Attacker Source / Root Cause Attackers should be, as
far as possible, identified or the root of the attack
like a specific worm depicted.
Vulnerability Vulnerability is the flaw in the sys-
tem/protocol that allowed the attack to take place.
Tools Also the tools involved on a high interaction
attack like root-kits or back-doors should be doc-
umented.
Discussions about attacks on honeypots should always
have such an profile as their basis. Motivation often can
only be guessed, however actions on high-interaction
honeypots might reveal some insights. The breadth and
depth can be derived from the attack frequency, the
attack propagation and on high-interaction honeypots
by the degree of the infection. Concealment on low-
interaction honeypots is depicted by slow, not invasive
but long attacks and on high-interaction honeypots by
the quality of installed back-doors and root-kits. The
attack source can usually be determined by transactional
meta information, however the root cause of the found
attack might be more difficult to identify, as it tries
to explain the actual observations. Vulnerabilities are
usually identified by exploit detection techniques. These
characteristics are now discussed in the following sub-
sections.
B. Attack Sources
If attacks occur on a honeypot, one has to specify
where the attacks came from. The identification of an
attacker is independent from the architecture or interac-
tion type of the honeypot and can be done with different
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granularities.
IP-Address or IP-Prefix (1)
Autonomous System Number (2)
Domain Name / URL / URL-Type (3)
Country (4)
UserID / Email (5)
User Agent (6)
Operating System (7)
However, in the case of the server honeypots one has
to consider that they might have received a spoofed
IP-address. This might be a valid IP-address with a
reachable or unreachable host, or it is a martial IP-
address which should not have ever left the local seg-
ments like the broadcast address 0.0.0.0 [147]. Client
honeypots usually are seeded with URL-lists and crawl
for new URLs. The resources behind those URLs might
be off-line. Moreover, one has to acknowledge that this
identifiers are very changeable. IP-addresses can move
from host to host because internet network providers use
IP-address-pools. That is the reason why some analysis
combine IP-addresses with a timestamp and define an
attack source as an IP-address that targets the honeypot
environment for example within one day [145]. IP-Prefix
announcements from autonomous systems change over
time or might be even hijacked. The Domain Name
System inherently allows the abstraction from IP-address
and/or hosts, which might lead to misleading results.
Client honeypot such as Monkey-Spider [9] also perform
some type of URL classification based on the URL
and page-content, e.g adult content, pirate, typos etc..
The country might be extracted from the AS-registration
information or some (commercial) third-party product
has used to be used to retrieve the data [146], [148].
However, trends show that usually the top 3 countries
cause 60% of the traffic, which countries are observed
is depended on the geographical location of the hon-
eypot node. Another way used to identify spammers
in instant messaging networks is the user name or
the advertised URL [149]. Spammers tend to create a
lot of accounts, which distribute many different URLs,
which however lead/redirect to only a small subset of
websites. A minor correlation between spim and spam
senders exist. Research based on honeypots supporting
the SIP/VoIP protocol also use the name of the user-
agent for the fingerprinting of the attack source [150].
This information can be used by any protocol with such
protocol-tag, however one has to keep in mind that
such information can be omitted and easily spoofed.
In order to infer the operating system from which the
attacks originate from, usually additional passive OS
fingerprinting tools like p0f are used, which recognize
the attacking OS by analysing the packet composition as
each OS creates the packets slightly differently. Almost
all attacking machines are Windows-based [2].
C. Attack Target
If it is specified who attacks the honeypot, the next
step might be to characterize the attack, more precisely
one has to determine the target of the attack. Server
honeypots classify the target by a specific service, which
is usually bound to a dedicated port. Port numbers are
administered by the Internet Assigned Numbers Au-
thority (IANA) and viewable in official lists. However,
services might be bound to another port. Therefore it is
important to differentiate between ports and services, as
an intruder might to brute force a SSH-service on another
port, which can be recognized by incoming valid SSH-
packets on non-default ports. Most of the time, services
are bound to default ports to improve reachability, that
is why many researches treat a port as representative
for a service [145], [146]. If a honeypot monitors a
whole network each individual IP-address can be seen
as a target identifier. Such networks can be classified in
detail into campus, enterprise, serive provider networks.
Measurements indicate differences between these classes
of networks [151].
IP (8)
Port (9)
Service (10)
Client honeypots use a software client, which accesses a
potentially malicious remote service. Therefore the target
is usually the specific client software. It might be an
emulated web-browser for low-interaction honeypots or
a real one with plugins like Flash for high-interaction
honeypots.
Software Client (11)
Software Plugins (12)
Moreover, high-interaction honeypots (client as well as
server) allow modifications to the operating system.
Therefore OS-specific changes have to be analysed,
which might differ across systems. For Linux it usually
means the loading of some hidden kernel-modules and
new cron jobs, for Windows Systems changes in the
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registry, system files and auto start entries. So an analysis
might examine which OS is preferably attacked.
OS, OS component (13)
D. Attack Frequency
One of the fundamental questions which has to be
answered while deploying honeypots is if and how
often honeypots are attacked? Interestingly, honeypots
are exposed to attacks minutes after they have been
activated [146]. However, this hold only true if the
honeypot is accessible from the internet, if a firewall
blocks all incoming connections to the firewall and only
internal communication is allowed attacks are observed
rarely as they would have to come from infected hosts
from within this specific network or because of a local
misconfiguration.
Time until First Attack (14)
Yegneswaran et al. [1] defined three metrics to de-
scribe the source arrivals in order to find differences for
the events of misconfiguration, bot-attacks and worms-
attacks. These are (i) the temporal source counts, (ii)
the arrival window and (iii) the interarrival distribution.
The first is analysed by the number of sources per time
interval and shows distinctive patterns. Worms show a
logistic growth with a steep begin and end, as they
propagate very fast and autonomously and are shut down
abruptly by a patch. Bots show similar characteristics,
however bots usually apply a poll and pull communica-
tion pattern with their C&C server using a wake up time
every x seconds, which results in less steeper curves.
The arrival window checks how many new sources have
arrived in a specific time frame. Using a cumulative
distribution function (CDF) plot no differences betweens
these events could have been spotted. To evaluate the
source interarrival characteristics, the data is broken
up in successive intervals, each with an equal number
of sources (e.g., 10 intervals each with 10% of new
sources). Then the distribution of interarrival times is
plotted. Bot-attacks and worm-attacks show exponential
interarrivals. Moreover, the source-net dispersion can be
interesting. Worm outbreaks have a much higher disper-
sion than bot nets and misconfigurations. A histogram
can be computed on the count of sources seen from
each /8 address aggregate if IP-addresses are considered,
however other aggregates can be used.
Number of Sources per Time Unit (15)
Number of new Sources per Time Unit (CDF) (16)
Interarrival Time Distribution for
equally-sized Source Intervals (17)
Number of Sources in specific IP-Aggregates (18)
Another metric combining the attack sources and
frequency is relating the number of IP-addresses as a
function of the number of attacks for each address [152].
This histogram follows the power-law distribution.
Number of Sources per Number of Attacks (19)
As we already have clarified the term attack is de-
pendent on the honeypot type used. Server honeypots
do assess any communication as malicious, hereby low-
interaction server honeypots describe the attack fre-
quency necessarily based on network properties like:
Received Packets per Time Unit (20)
Received Data (kB) per Time Unit (21)
Measurements [151] show, that if TCP is the dominant
procotol, packet sizes are relatively constant and hence
the ration between received packets and data per time
unit is predictable. Attack frequencies usually show
specific peaks, instant massaging spam for example
shows two daily peaks and one if observed on a weekly
scale [149]. Moreover, peaks in attack frequencies can
usually be linked to a single service, worm-activity etc.
[148], which is heavily exploited at this specific point
of time. Instant messaging and email honeypots can use
the following metrics:
Messages/Emails Received per Time Unit (22)
URLs / Attachments Received per Time Unit (23)
Received Data (kB) per Message (24)
For high-interaction server honeypots the same metrics
apply, however they can be extended by a OS-specific
metric:
Exploitations per Time Unit (25)
Client honeypots only count, independent from their
interaction level, the exploitations per time unit and do
not consider network features for the attack frequency
as they actively begin the communication. That means,
that it is preconfigured at which rate a client honeypot
makes communication requests. So only exploitations are
considered.
21
Another procedure used is the sessionization [152] of
the data. All the packets received from the same source
within a time frame or without triggering a timeout
are supposed to belong to the same attack session. 24
hours frames or 30 minutes timeouts are common. Fur-
thermore, the time between the occurrence of an attack
and the next attack can be examined. The probability
density function (PDF) for this metric follows a heavy-
tailed power-law and can be modelled by mixture of a
Pareto and an exponential distribution. The lifetime of
a source can be described as the complete time we see
a source active on a honeypot [1], that means it is the
time span from the source’s first occurrence up to is lasts
activity and might include several sessions. Botnets and
misconfigurations cause short lifetimes, however worms
prove to be persistent as they often miss a mechanism to
stop scanning. If a specific source is observed regularly
(that means it has frequent sessions or one long ongoing
session), then it has a long source lifetime. Additionally,
Song et al. [148] differentiate their sessions based on
a IDS classification: All traffic data to the honeypot
which triggers an IDS alert is labelled as a known attack
session, all traffic data which ends with the transmission
of shellcode but does not trigger an IDS alert is an
unknown attack session. The time between sessions is
also worth considering, as it displays the pause between
active sessions.
Number of Sessions per Time Unit (26)
Session Duration (27)
Time between Sessions (28)
Source Lifetime (29)
(Un-) Known Attack Sessions per Time Unit (30)
Song et al. [148] demonstrated a plot, which visualizes
the frequency of the most targeted port per day. They
plot the destination port as a function of time using a
log-scale for the ports. The log-scale is an advantage
because most of the attacks happen on the smaller well-
known ports. The curve shows jumps across discrete
levels representing ports of well-known ports for SSH,
SMB and so on.
Similar to the notation of sessions are the flows [153].
The basic flows are based on the basic IP-flow and
described by a 5-tuple consisting of source and desti-
nation IP-address, source and destination port, protocol
type. The attack frequency can also be described by
the occurrence of basic flows: If a packet differs from
another packet by any key-field or arrives after a time-
out, it is considered to belong to another flow. Therefore
flows are a more strict requirement than sessions. Ac-
tivity flows are an aggregation of basic flows based on
the source IP-address only with a timeout for the inter-
arrival time between basics flows. Hence, they resemble
the definition of session.
Number of Basic Flows per Time Unit (31)
Number of Activity Flows per Time Unit (32)
E. Attack Evolution
If we observe certain temporal patterns for a specific
source, port, country etc. , it may be important to detect
unusual behaviour for it automatically, because those
anomalies might mark important events. That means, we
want to learn, what normal behaviour is and to spot if
this normal behaviour changes.
One possible method is to calculate ratios for different
time aggregates and compare those values for different
days or to the average ratio. This method is useful to
recognize temporal trends which are only visible on a
specific time scale [154]. The choice of a good time
granularity depends on the kind of attack phenomena
which is investigated: For short high-intensity attacks,
like botnet probes or flash worms, it may be more useful
to apply smaller time units, while for worms with a
stealthier propagation scheme a larger time unit should
be used.
Francois et al. [147] demonstrated that graph inter-
sections can be used to analyse distributed honeypot
platforms. This method allows to highlight changes in
the relationships between honeypots, for example if the
percentage of mutual attacking IP-addresses changes for
two nodes. Their research is based on two metrics, which
create one value for the complete honeynet and not one
value for each honeypot, which makes the analysis more
simple. First, the maximal locality statistic, which is
strongly related to the centrality measurement of graphs.
ψk(v) denots the number of arcs of the subgraph of
neighbours of v at a max. distance k.
Mk = max
v∈nodes
ψk(v) (33)
Second, the standardized locality statistics at time t of
the distributed system, which is calculated with respect
to previous values of a sliding window with a size of τ .
ψ˜k,t(v) =
ψk,t(v)− µˆk,t,τ (v)
max(σˆk,t,τ (v), 1)
(34)
with common average value
µˆk,t,τ (v) =
1
τ
∗
t−1∑
t′=t−τ
ψk,t′(v) (35)
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and variance
σˆk,t,τ (v) =
1
τ − 1
t−1∑
t′=t−τ
(ψk,t′(v)− µˆk,t′(v))2
M˜k,t = max
v∈nodes
ψ˜k,t(v)
The standardized locality statistic of a node is nearing
zero if its number of edges remains stable. High posi-
tive or negative values point out significant changes in
the graph structure. However, this is not a necessary
conditions. The standardized locality and especially the
maximum standardized locality may not differ after a
change, if the number of edges for individual nodes did
not change.
The first analysis was done to identify honeypots
which capture unique attacking IP-addresses. Two nodes
in the graph are linked only if the intersection between
the corresponding sets represents less than a threshold
α of the union of addresses. Therefore, central nodes
(high locality value) capture unique IP-addresses. When
the maximal standardized locality statistics is low, no
changes have occurred, however a high value indicates a
major topology change: the relationships of attacking IP-
address differ to the previous time instances. A similar
analysis can be done for ports, an edge connects to nodes
only if the set intersection of their attacked ports is lower
then a threshold β.
Another way to distinguish between known and new
patterns and highlight their occurrence was presented by
Yegneswaran et al. [1]. They deployed a combination of
honeypots and the intrusion detection system Bro. There-
fore their events are based on Bro-profiles. However,
their methodology can also be applied to pure honeypot
data. They use a deviation value β to detect large-scale
and unusual events. β > 10 indicates botnet-waves and
fast-scanning worms, β > 3 slow-scanning worms.
βpi = mpi/
i−1∑
j=0
pj (36)
where pi denotes the number of sources triggering profile
p in time interval i, m denotes the number of intervals
prior to i where p was observed.
Bro was also used to create profiles for new events,
however one of the findings concludes that usually new
events are just new minor variations of known activity.
Kaaniche et al. [152] presented a time evolution model
created by linear regression. They examined, if a model
based on observations restricted to attacks originating
from a specific country can describe the complete data
set reliably. Surprisingly, they found a strong correlation
between the models for single countries and the overall
data set, independently from the countries proportion
of the total number of attacks (some of the best fit
countries account only for 2%-20% of attacks). The
linear regression model is defined by:
Y ∗(i) =
∑
αjXj(t) + β, j = 1, 2, ..k (37)
where Xj(t) denotes observed attacks from country j,
αj and β are best fit linear model parameters.
The correlation between models is measured by the
correlation factor:
R2 =
∑
(Y ∗(i)− Yav)2/
∑
(Y (i)− Yav)2 where
Y (i) observed attacks, Yav average number of attacks (38)
Such correlation factors can be used to rate if the
observed events are expected or vary substantially, that
means have a high similarity distance to the model.
F. Propagation of Attacks
Besides analysing the attack activities in a isolated
manner, one should also try to identify the propagation of
attacks across several honeypots if a large honeynet is de-
ployed. Propagation takes place, when one attacking IP-
address is observed on one platform, then subsequently
on another [152]. Because of the IP-address-pools, this
check for reoccurrence should happen within a specific
time-frame for more precise results. Already early dis-
tributed honeypot analysis show that it is beneficial to
deploy a large amount of honeypots from different IP-
subnets and different geographical positions [40], as it
is more likely to spot an attack, local events can be
characterized as such and the propagation of an attacker
across targets can be depicted.
Propagation can be modelled by a propagation graph
[152], where nodes represent the individual honeypots
and the edges (i, j) describe the probability to discover
a seen IP-address at node i also at node j. However,
nodes tend to show low propagation value, if not in the
same subnet.
Propagation Graph (39)
Similarly, Vasilomanolakis et al. [7] describe the prop-
agation of attacks by single-dimensional correlation and
two-dimensional correlation.
Single-dimensional correlation aggregates attacks
from the same origin, if the attack origin has been ob-
served on at least 2 sensors. This correlation is analysed
by two visualisations. First, a directed graph is created
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with nodes for all honeypots and observed attackers. A
directed edge represents an attack to a honeypot, that
means that multiple edges to different sensors mark the
attackers presence on several honeypots. Second, the
ratio of unique attackers that have been observed on var-
ious honeypots is calculated. Vasilomanolakis findings
suggest that the presence on more than two sensors is
very unlikely for attackers. Two-dimensional correlation
includes time as an additional dimension, which means
that a mutual attack has to be observed on at least
two sensors within a specific time-frame. As already
discussed, this time frame should be below one day
because of IP-address pooling. Vasilomanolakis argues
reasonably that internet-wide scanning has been signifi-
cantly improved in the last years: Publicly available tools
like ZMap [155] are capable of performing a complete
scan of the IPv4 address space for one port with one
probe per host in about 1 hour. Therefore, in order to
find strong relations one can set the time frame to 1 hour
and even lower. Lastly, they use a scatter plot, which
uses time slots of one hour and plots the number of
unique attackers present on several sensors, in addition
a colour signifies on how many sensors the attackers
were present. Their observations suggest, that at least
one unique attacker is targeting multiple sensor per time
slot.
Attack Graph (40)
Ratio of Unique Attackers in
Relation to Number of Targeted Sensors (41)
Number of Unique Mutual Attackers in
Relation to Targets per Time Slot (42)
A phase plot can also be used to visualize the suc-
cessive targets, showing the next target as a function of
the last target for a specific amount of attack samples
[1]. Sequential IP-address scans will appear as a straight
diagonal line in this visualization. Phase plots can also
visualize the coverage, which is the number of probed
honeynet IP-addresses by a specific source. A full cov-
erage can be recognized as a horizontal line.
Phase Plot: Successive Destination Targets (43)
Phase Plot: Destination Targets for specific Sources (44)
Attacks on different targets can be visualized by a
destination-net scan footprint [151] which is a plot count-
ing the number of attack sources over all targets they
have attacked. Obviously, this visualization works best if
many honeypots are deployed or whole subnets are redi-
rected to a honeypot. Misconfigurations tend to show hot
spots, worms and bot cause an evenly distributed pattern.
Furthermore, the first destination preference might be
interesting to analyse, as this might reveal some ordering
in the scanning of subnets by worms and bots.
Destination Net Scan Footprint (45)
PDF of First Destination Preference (46)
G. Attack Patterns
The general concept of many data mining tasks, like
common pattern detection and clustering, involves the
following procedure with three steps [156]:
1) feature selection and/or extraction, pattern repre-
sentation
2) definition of a pattern proximity measure appro-
priate to the data domain
3) grouping similar patterns
The first step includes the extraction of certain features
characterizing the relevant aspects of the data set and
representing them with an adequate means, for example
an array of values. An effective measure to describe the
similarity of two data series is done by a similarity dis-
tance such as Mahalanobis, Pearson, Spearman etc. . The
grouping or clustering of patterns is done by clustering
algorithms like the K-Means-Algorithm.
Unfortunately, the discipline of pattern detection does
not offer a straight forward method for all data types.
Not every algorithm can handle all cluster shapes or
sizes and runtime or output quality might differ severely
on different data dimensionality and types. Different
clustering algorithms produce different partitions of data,
and even the same clustering algorithm is dependant on
its initializations and configurable parameters. Indeed,
the real skill in pattern detection is the choice of a
proper clustering algorithm (and similarity measure) as
hundreds of clustering algorithms exist [157]. This is the
reason why we see so many different approaches in the
field of honeypot attack pattern detection, but also any
other clustering discipline.
The problem of network traffic clustering and anomaly
detection is not a new discipline and has been exten-
sively studied. Approaches commonly utilise signature
based methods in combination with intrusion detection
systems, statistics (e.g. Moving Average Models [158],
[159], Principal Component Analysis [160], [161]) or
data mining and unsupervised machine learning (e.g
hierarchical clustering [162], KNN-clustering [163]).
However, only some research was done explicitly in
the field of honeypot traffic analysis [164]. Therefore,
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we concentrate on the publications which effectively
deployed and/or analysed honeypot and honeynet traffic.
The widespread procedure of association rule mining
was applied by Pouget [145] to find interesting rela-
tionships and patterns between observed events. With
the induction of association rules one tries to find sets
of items, i.e. events, port numbers, IP-addresses and so
on, that frequently occur together. It originates from
customer behaviour analysis, that tries to recommend
products based on sets of collectively bought items. This
means that an association rule R states that if we see
specific action a and b, we can be confident, quantified
by a percentage, that also action c will be observed:
a∩b⇒ c. The metrics which are applied are support and
confidence. Support is the ratio between the number
of transactions that include all items of the rule and all
transactions. Confidence is the ratio between the number
of transactions that include all items of the rule and the
transactions that contain the premise. Rules should have
a minimal support threshold so that only meaningful
rules are found.
Supp(R) =
#transactions incl. {a ∩ b ∩ c}
#transactions
(47)
Conf(R) =
#transactions incl. {a ∩ b ∩ c}
#transactions incl. {a ∩ b} (48)
Pouget applied association rules to each found port
sequence group and mined on the following features:
number T of machines in the environment targeted
by one attack source, ni number of packets sent by
attack source to honeypot i and N , which is the total
number of packets sent by one attack source to the whole
environment. The resulting rules represented meaningful
clusters, which have been ascribed to attack tools and
offer a good alternative to clustering by port sequences
only.
One of the first extensive works on honeypot data was
done by Thonnard et al. [154], who group attacks on
a honeynet by detecting common time series patterns.
They have used the data from the leurre.com project
and their data aggregation is based on the ordered list of
ports targeted by a source identified by an IP-address. All
attackers having the same attack fingerprint are classified
into one set, then the number of unique source counts
per time unit for each class is calculated. Furthermore,
only time series’ which have at least one peak of activity
with a minimum of x = 10 sources for a given time unit
are considered. That means, that featureless data (port
sequences which are not mutual) is filtered to assure a
certain quality. The symbolic aggregate approximation
(SAX) is used to reduce the dimensionality of the data
and to make a fast similarity distance evaluation possible.
SAX approximates time series data by segmenting into
time intervals of equal size and summarizing each of
these intervals by its mean value. Each interval is then
mapped to a finite alphabet symbol. The alphabet is
chosen relatively, i.e. symbol B representing the range
20%-30% of the maximum unique source count etc. .
Time series can then be interpreted and compared as
a string. Thonnard defined similarity if more then 90%
of the symbols match for a given pattern and used an
alphabet with 8 symbols. If N is the number of elements
in time series T , the dist()-function returns the inter-
symbol distance and ω is the number of intervals in the
SAX representation, then the minimum SAX distance can
be calculated as follows:
SAX(WT1 ,WT2) =
√
N
ω
√√√√( ω∑
i=1
dist(WT1(i),WT2(i))
)2
(49)
Comparing the resemblance of temporal behaviour,
Thonnard et al. found only three patterns of attacks:
1) continuous activity
2) sustained bursts
3) ephemeral spikes
Especially the ephemeral spikes can lead to a false simi-
larity measurement, because the symbols of the alphabet
are chosen relatively due to a standardization process.
This means that temporal patterns with only a few spikes
and many zeros or very small values have a mean value
close to zero. SAX calculates a high similarity degree
because all these values are represented by only one
symbol. However, a similarity has not to be the case.
Therefore a global and local similarity measure is neces-
sary. Global similarity SIMG is defined using the largest
lower-bounding distance that is theoretically possible, as
denoted by the abstract variables WT and W˜T which
have maximal distance for every pair of symbols. Local
similarity SIML compares only values, if one of the
patterns exceeds the upper quantile value UQ at a given
time unit, 0.975 was used by Thunnard. Again, WT and
W˜T are used to calculate the largest distance between
every pair of symbols based on XUQ. Both measures
are combined to obtain the total similarity.
SIMG(WT1 ,WT2 ) = 1−
SAX(WT1 ,WT2 )
SAX(WT , W˜T )
(50)
XUQ = ∪2k=1
(
xi|WTk (xi) > UQ, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., |WTk |}
)
(51)
SIML(WT1 ,WT2 ) = 1−
∑|XUQ|
j=1 SAX(WT1 (xj),WT2 (xj))∑|XUQ|
j=1 SAX(WT (xj), W˜T (xj))
(52)
SIMtotal =
SIMG + SIML
2
(53)
The clustering algorithm applied is a greedy algorithm,
which takes a pattern and combines all other patterns
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Figure 2. SecVis visualization overview by Krasser.
which exceed the similarity threshold to a cluster and
then excludes the found cluster from the pattern list.
Afterwards the next remaining pattern are analysed.
Clique-similar clusters emerge. Despite the local deci-
sion making scheme, fairly good results are produced
and another advantage is that the number of total cluster
has not to be known in beforehand.
Krasser [165] presented a way to make attack patterns
on honeypots easily detectable to the human eye. It is not
based on a statistical method, but rather presents an in-
tuitive way of visualizing network traffic information in
real-time for monitoring or in playback mode for foren-
sics. It is a combination of animated scatter plots and
parallel coordinate plots. Figure 2 shows an overview of
the visualization. The left vertical line denotes the source
IP-address, 0.0.0.0 is at the bottom, 255.255.255.255 is
at the top. The right vertical line denotes the destination
port, port 0 at the bottom, port 65535 at the top.
Coloured lines connect those vertical lines, one line
for each packet. UDP packets are visualized by blue
links, TCP packet by green links. Each packets also
triggers two bars, whose height represent the packet
size. The bars move away from the vertical lines as
the packets gets older. Krasser successfully demonstrated
that this visualization is useful for visualizing inbound
as well as outbound traffic and is capable of highlighting
differences in the traffic bit rates, common attack ports
and sources or patterns like reoccurring worm attacks.
Almotairi [153] has used the principal component
analysis (PCA) to separate latent groups of activities
and to find outliers from cluster groups. The PCA is a
multivariate statistical technique which is used to reduce
the dimensionality of a data set into a few linearly
uncorrelated variables, called the principal components.
The resulting number of principal components is less
than or equal to the number of original variables p
and the components are defined and ordered in such a
way that the first component has the largest variance.
Therefore much of the variance in the original set can
be retained be choosing the first k PCs with k < p. PCs
are usually selected by the Kaisers’ rule [166], which
suggests the elimination of all PCs with a Eigenvalue of
less than one.
Ci =
Xi − X¯i√
si
(54)
Z = ATC (55)
Z1 = A
T
1 C = a11C1 + a12C2 + a13C3 + ...+ a1pCp
...
Zk = A
T
kC = ak1C1 + ak2C2 + ak3C3 + ...+ akpCp
To calculate the PCs the p-dimensional vector X =
(X1, .., Xp)
T is standardized by Ci for all i = 1..p,
where X¯i is the sample mean and si is the sam-
ple variance for Xi. Empirical experience shows that
PCAs on honeypot data should be calculated using
the correlation matrix R of C. The Eigenvector of R
is A = (A1, ..., Ak)T , the Eigenvalue vector of C is
l = (l1, ..., lp) and the first component equals to Z1. The
components can be interpreted by analysing the loading
of the components variables, as high loading indicates
significance, which allows the assignment to events like
targeted attacks against open ports or scan activities.
Eventually, the results can be visualized with scatter plots
having a PC on each axis, which Almotairi used to find
interrelations between components and also to identify
extreme activities or outliers. Those can be identified by
sight, however also automatically by applying contours,
the population ellipsoids, around the mean values (Zik
is the score of the kth PC of ith observation, lk is the
kth Eigenvalue). The first and last components can give
interesting insights, as they mark the most and least
important properties.
p∑
k=1
Z2ik
lk
= const, e.g.:
Z2i1
l1
+
Z2i2
l2
≤ 5.8 (56)
One of the latest honeypot attack analysis was pub-
lished by Owezarski [164], whose approach uses unsu-
pervised machine learning methods and applies robust
clustering techniques. Eventually, this method creates
signatures automatically based on the clusters. This
analysis is founded on a general algorithm which was
applied to recognize anomalies in production traffic
[167] and was altered to work on server honeypots traffic.
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Owezarski aims at increasing the robustness of the
clustering algorithm by the divide and conquer approach
sub-space clustering (SSC) and the notion of clustering
ensembles. A clustering ensemble P consists of a set
of N partitions Pn produced for the same data with
n = 1, ..., N by the same clustering algorithm. Each
of these partitions provides different and independent
exposure of data patterns, which then can be combined
to a global cluster including all metrics and facilitating
a holistic understanding of the threat. A shift of the
similarity measure from patterns to the clustering results
takes place. This is possible because of the downward
closure property [168]: If a collection of points is a
cluster in a d-dimensional space, then it is also part
of a cluster in any (d-1) projections of this space. More-
over, high-dimensional data tends to be sparse, there-
fore clustering algorithms create better results in lower
dimensions, which also have a smaller computational
cost. The partitions are combined by the Inter Clustering
Result Association (ICRA) method to correlate clusters
and Inter Outlier Association (IOA) method to correlate
outliers. The notion of graphs is used: a vertex is a
cluster/outlier from any sub-space and an edge represents
a high similarity. For ICRA, similarity CS is calculated
by the ratio of mutual flows the clusters Ci are based
on, a threshold of 0.9 was effective for Owezarskis data:
CS(C1, C2) =
|(C1∩C2)|
max(|C1|,|C2|) > 0.9. IOA links outlier
vertices if and only if completely the same flows are
responsible for that outlier. Similar to Thonnard [154]
a greedy algorithm is used to recognize cluster-cliques
because of performance reasons. The intersection of all
flows present within cluster-cliques form the anomaly of
interest.
Gregio et al. [169] have demonstrated the effectiveness
of classical data mining and supervised classification
approaches in the honeypot data log analysis using the
well-established k-nearest neighbour (KNN) algorithm,
neural networks and decision trees. The purpose of this
analysis is to differentiate between internet noise like
inoffensive or known traffic and anomalies and real
attacks. So their setup does not only include honeypot
traffic which is labelled as an attack but also productive
traffic which is labelled as normal. Both traffic types
are used to support a learning process and to make
a classification of traffic possible. KNN uses a simple
classification principle: For each instance of data of
unknown class the distance to data with known classes
is calculated and the k nearest neighbours decide by a
majority vote which class is selected for the unknown
element [157]. Artificial neural networks are computing
structures that are composed of single processing units
called neurons. Different forms of neural networks exist,
however a well-understood and commonly used model
is the multilayer perceptron (MLP). MLP utilizes a
supervised learning technique called backpropagation for
training the network and consists of multiple layers of
neurons in a directed graph [170]. A decision tree is a
machine learning algorithm which performs successive
partitioning of the original data set into successively
more homogeneous subgroups. Each node in a decision
tree resembles a partition decision. Hence, the higher a
decision tree is the higher the detail level of clustering
[171]. For the most simple classification of traffic, either
suspicious or normal, the KNN algorithm was too slow to
create reasonable results, neuronal networks performed
good and produced good results, however with a quite
high share of false negative. Decision trees preformed
best and produced correct results with few false positives
and a moderate number of false negatives.
Honeycomb [172] is one of the most famous HoneyD
plugins and scans incoming traffic to detect repeating
patterns in packet payloads using the longest common
substring (LCS) algorithm. This implementation is based
on suffix trees, which are used as building blocks for
a variety of string algorithms. Using suffix trees, the
longest common substring of two strings is straightfor-
ward to find in linear time. Suffix trees can be gener-
ated for example with the Ukkonen’s algorithm [173].
Honeycomb performs a protocol analysis which orders
traffic by network and transport layer header information
(IP-address or Ports). After that LCS is applied in two
different ways: Vertical pattern detection concatenates
for two connections the incoming messages into one
string, respectively, and compares then the resulting
string. Horizontal pattern detection compares for two
connections two messages at the same depth in the
dialogue, that means that LCS is applied to the n-th
messages.
Sampling is the process of selecting a subset of
individuals from within a statistical population to es-
timate the overall characteristics. Connection sampling
can greatly benefit the analysis by reducing bandwidth
and memory requirements, which ultimately improves
the scalability. Yegneswaran et. al [151] have shown,
that subset properties from honeypot data are able do
describe trends and patterns of the overall data, such as
finding h¨eavy hitters.¨ The data set was reduced by two
methods. The first method chooses randomly flows and
counts the related packets. The second method considers
only a subnet of the observed network.
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H. Attack Root Cause Identification
Attack root causes can be defined as the most basic
cause that can be reasonably identified as the origin of a
attack. The root cause can be associated to a specific
attack tool, or one of its variants or configurations.
One of the main tasks of honeypot data analysis is the
assignment of clusters and recognized patterns to root
causes. However, this is not necessarily an one-to-one
relationship, as it is difficult to guarantee that a found
cluster is caused by only one attack tool and that one
attack tool does not cause two clusters, for example
by different attack configurations. Ultimately, a cluster
should always remain explicable in its formation [145].
Before a cluster can be assigned to an attack root
cause, it is necessary to validate the cluster coherency,
that is if we found good (meaningful) clusters. Un-
doubted, different attacks can create the same number
of packets on the same ports, therefore a pure statistical
analysis of transactional data might be not enough.
One possible way of determining the coherence is by
considering the packet data content. The payload of all
packets sent from one attack source can be transformed
into strings and concatenated. This creates an attack
fingerprint, which then can be used to check the cluster
coherency by comparing the fingerprints by a simple
string distance measure like the Levenshtein distance.
Pouget [145] used this method to prove that his cluster-
ing technique is meaningful, as the fingerprints i from a
Cluster C mostly have a distance di = 0 to their cluster
partners, resulting in a very low average distance DC
for a cluster, which in turn means that a mutual payload
exists.
di =
∑
j∈C
D(i, j)
n− 1 (57)
DC =
∑
i∈C
di
n
=
∑
i,j∈C,i<j
2D(i, j)
(n− 1)n (58)
Polymorphic attacks are attacks that are able to change
their appearance with every instance. Thus, polymorphic
worms pose a big challenge to the honeypot pattern de-
tection, and more specifically to root cause identification,
as worms might change the attack vector for exploiting
the vulnerability or the attack body might change by
garbage insertions, encryption, instruction reordering and
so on. Therefore (sub-) string based methods like LCS
are insufficient. Different approaches exist, however their
research is based on the mutual premise that despite
the polymorphism the worms must have some invariant
substrings. Indeed, such invariants exist [174] and the
meaningful strings which can be used for classification
have to be found.
Tang and Chen [175] proposed the design of a double-
honeypot as a counter measure to worms. The nov-
elty of this system is the ability to distinguish worm
activities from non-attacking behaviour on honeypots,
as for example misconfigurations. This system is com-
posed of two independent honeypot arrays, the inbound
array consisting of high-interaction honeypots which
allows compromise and an outbound array consisting
low-interaction honeypots. If a compromised inbound
honeypot tries to find and infect other victims, all
outgoing traffic initiated by the honeypot will be redi-
rected by a network translator to the outbound array.
If one of the outbound honeypots sees network traffic,
a compromise on the inbound honeypot took definitely
place. Expanding this work, Mohammed, Hashim et
al. [176] proposed a double-honeynet to solve some
of the limitations of the double-honeypot. The double-
honeynet is a combination of two honeynets consisting
only of server high-interaction honeypots. One honeynet
is destined to receive incoming connection requests Once
a honeypot from the first honeynet H1, is compromised,
a worm will attempt to make outbound connections.
An internal translator intercepts all outbound traffic and
redirects it to the second honeynet H2, which also
allows the infection. This procedure repeats, causing the
worm to spread back and forth across the honeynets
and to manifest different instances. Those instance are
collected centrally and a signature generation algorithm
is initiated: First a substrings extraction process takes
place which creates the set of all possible substrings and
determines their frequency. Then the PCA is applied on
the frequency count to reduce the dimension and get the
most significant strings, which then can be used to create
a signature and to define a root cause.
Another way of assigning the attacks root cause is by
determining which attack tool was used to convey the
attack. This can be done by analysing port sequences or
the TCP Initial Sequence Number (ISN).
ISN (59)
Port Sequence (60)
Some attack tools use always the same ISN or a bad
random number generator with a low entropy [147],
which makes it possible to assign some ISN to specific
attack tools. Moreover, honeypots receive backscatter
packets, which are SYN-ACK replies to spoofed SYN
packets and therefore possess the ISN+1. Again, these
are typical ISNs, which could be linked to specific tools.
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The analysis by port sequences was introduced by
Pouget at al. [145] in order to show that frequen-
t/repetitive attacks on honeypots create large amount of
data, which might lead to misleading results if general
statistics are applied. However, a closer look on port
sequences can reveal some hidden phenomena. A port
sequence is a time ordered sequence of ports without du-
plicates [2] that represents the order in which the attack
sources (IP-address with a timeout of 1 day for Pouget)
sent packets to specific ports, for example: Attacker sents
TCP requests to port 135, again on 135 and then on
port 4444 creates {135T, 4444T}. Port Sequences can
be created for observations on a single honeypot or for
observations on several honeypots. Preliminary results
from Pouget showed that each sequence is often limited
to only one port, and that a port sequence represented as
a set is almost uniquely identified by this set, however
because of some rare cases the ordered sequence was
preferred. Pouget observed more than twice as many
port sequences as unique targeted ports. The distribution
is similar to other metrics, as the top 8 sequences
already characterize the activity of about 75% of the
attacks [177]. These results motivated a further in- depth
investigation.
Another possibility to deduce an attack to a specific
attack tool was discovered by Kohlrausch [178]. During a
buffer overflow the instruction counter (EIP) is overwrit-
ten with a new return address at which the shell code can
be assumed. Moreover, honeypots like Argos track the
preceding value of the instruction counter (faulty EIP)
which is the last legitimate instruction before the exploit
had taken over the control. Evaluations show, that the
values of the EIP and faulty EIP are characteristic for
an exploit tool and operating system pair. However, this
analysis might be strongly biased by active address space
randomization algorithms.
EIP and faulty EIP (61)
Another major problem in identifying a single root
cause for attacks on honeypots were discovered by Alata
and Pouget [179], [180]. Pouget made the observation
that different sets of compromised machines are used
to carry out the various stages of planned attacks. That
means, that a single attacker causes different attack
patterns from different machines on the honeypot. In
addition, Alata observed this phenomenon also on a
SSH high-interaction honeypot. Two groups of attacking
machines have been spotted: The first group is com-
posed specifically to scan hosts and perform dictionary-
attacks. If they are successfully, usually a day later a
machine from the second group appears. This group
has no intersection with the first group in terms of IP-
address and geographical lookups even reveal different
countries. After a login the second machine tries to run
own services or get root access. Interestingly, comparing
the attack sources between low- and high-interaction
honeypot data sets demonstrates that mutual IP-addresses
are from the scanning group only, the second intrusion
group also never appears on low-interaction honeypots.
In general, attack root cause identification requires a
good knowledge of black-hat tools or recent participation
on security pages and mailing pages, which usually
inform about Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
(CVE). That is why it can be really difficult to assign
a honeypot attack cluster to a known attack tool. More-
over, because of the increasing complexity of worms it
is necessary to rather perform payload analysis (byte
sequences, shellcode commands etc.) [174] than pure
statistical evaluations and the mere detection of a exploit.
Honeypots are still used to collect worms, however the
signature generation for worms evolved into its own
broad field of studies and are rather the domain of
intrusion detection systems [181].
I. Attack Risk Assessment
The risk estimation is rather done on high interaction
honeypots, as it can be assessed based on the severity
of the vulnerability and the analysis of the exploit.
However, risk estimation can also be done for low-
interaction honeypots based on the scope of the attack,
which can be measured by three features describing the
amount of communication: The number of packets of the
attack, the amounts of bytes exchanged in the attack and
the communication duration.
risk = log(nPackets)+log(nBytes)+log(duration+1)
Ozewaski [164] extended this risk estimation by mul-
tiplying the risk value by the number of sub-spaces the
attack is found in, which is an indication for how many
network-features the attack affects.
risksubspace = C ∗ log(nPackets) + log(nBytes)
+ log(duration+ 1)
SweetBait [182] is designed to be an automated
response system that protects from random IP scan-
ning worms using low-interaction (honeyD) and high-
interaction (Argos) honeypots. Honeypots are used to
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create signatures, which then are sent to IDS/IPS sen-
sors in order to determine the virulence of worms on
production systems. The expected virulence of worms
is based on their aggressiveness, which is quantified by
the exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA)
of the number of alerts generated by each signature
on each period: m′ = w × a + (1 − w) × m, where
m′ is the new value, m the previous value and the
weight 0 < w ≤ 1 configures the computation to follow
more or less aggressively the recent changes in activity
levels, whereby values below 0.5 were not useful. This
EWMA value is then used to predict the virulence by
adjusting the value by port and protocol bias value,
which is useful for especially active ports like 145:
A = m × port bias × protocol bias. The EWMA can
be used not only to predict signatures observed by IDS,
but also any temporal pattern on honeypots.
J. Exploit Detection
As high interaction honeypots are actively exploited,
they also consider the vulnerabilities which were ex-
ploited in their analysis. Two main procedures to detect
exploitations and to find vulnerabilities are either the
data-driven technique (example: Argos) or the operating
system state monitoring (example: Capture-HPC) [178].
The former detects exploitations by dynamic taint anal-
ysis, which is based on the idea that all data from the
internet is potentially malicious and therefore is marked
as tainted. The data-flow of tainted data is monitored.
The exploitation of a honeypot is then specified as the
direct execution of tainted shell-code. Dynamic taint
analysis is very accurate and reliable to detect attacks
utilizing buffer overflows. The latter inspects the states
of operating systems and tries to spot illegitimate ac-
tions in the file system or process management. An
exploitation has occurred if modifications (sometimes
even read operations) are done to this specific locations,
no active execution of those modified files is required
by definition, however this usually happens implicitly.
Modifications can be recognized comparing the files with
a backup, by comparing hash-values or by controlling the
kernel-log for sensitive calls.
Argos memory tainting technique was extended by
SweetBait [182], which inserted its own shellcode into
the code that is under attack, which makes the gathering
of more information about the memory and process states
possible.
K. Overview Honeypot Data Analysis
Table VI gives an overview over the various honey-
pot metrics used in research projects. Interestingly, one
finding of this overview is that most of the researchers
tend to pose the first three presented questions, which
refer to the attack source, attack target and the frequency.
Furthermore, a common consensus exists in identifying
sources or targets and in describing the frequency, as
many of the metrics and analysis methods are reused
throughout the publications. The reason behind this
circumstance is that direct (apparent) information is
evaluated and in cases like the country-mapping ex-
tended by simple lookups. Direct information describes
the observations and is recorded in honeypot logs during
common operation: Usual honeypot logfiles contain the
source, the target and the timestamp of an attack based
on the IP information. It is important to note, especially
for the IP, that a communication without an IP- address
for the source and target would be not possible and each
event has a timestamp. Therefore, it is straightforward
and natural to pose analysis questions based on these
features.
However, this situation is different for the remaining
questions, because they attempt to derive information.
Derived information explains, assesses or localizes the
cause of the observations which is fundamentally more
complex than mere description. Since the analysis is
more complex, such research appeared later than simple
descriptive analysis and less overlaps between methods
exist. This is especially true for the pattern-detection,
which can be done by many different similarity mea-
sures and clustering algorithms (as explained in sub-
section V-G). The conduct of such analysis is growing
into an interdisciplinary approach, because in order to
derive information, basic statistics usually do not suffice
any more: sophisticated honeypot networks and methods
from other fields like association rule mining, neuronal
networks, memory tainting in virtual machines to name
a few, have become necessary. In general, the bond be-
tween honeypots and other research fields has intensified
during the last years.
VI. LEGAL AND ETHICAL CONCERNS
The deployment of honeypots involves the discussion
about legal and ethical liability. It is important to an-
nounce beforehand, that the legal situation is country-
dependent, furthermore, it is often difficult to decide
which laws apply if attacker and victim are situated
in different countries. However, this chapter aims to
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Table VI
METRICS USED IN HONEYPOT DATA ANALYSIS AND RELATED PUBLICATIONS.
Problem Statement Analysis Examples
Do common attack origins
exist?
IP-Address or IP-Prefix [1], [2], [145], [147], [148], [152]
Autonomous System Number —
Domain Name, URL, URL-Type [9], [146], [148], [149]
Country [2], [145], [146], [148], [149]
UserID / Email [149], [179]
(Worm-) Signature [1], [40], [148], [182]
User Agent [150]
Operating System [2], [145]
What is the target of the
attack?
IP [151], [152], [164], [176]
Port and Transport Protocol [2], [145], [147], [153], [154], [169]
Service [145], [146], [179]
Software Client, Plugins [9], [106]
Vulnerability [92], [179]
OS [2], [148]
What are the attack
frequencies?
Time until First Incoming Connection [146], [179]
Number of Incoming Connections per Time Unit [152]
Number of Sources per Time Unit [1], [144], [147], [154]
Number of new Sources per Time Unit (CDF) [1], [2]
Interarrival Time (Distribution for equally-sized
Source Intervals)
[1], [152], [176]
Number of Sources versus the number of attacks
per Source
[152]
Received Packets per Time Unit [147], [151], [169], [176]
Received Data (kB) per Time Unit [147], [151], [169], [176]
Messages/Emails Received per Time Unit [149]
URLs / Attachments Received per Time Unit [149]
Received Data (kB) per Message [149], [165]
Exploitations per Time Unit [178], [179]
Sessions per Time Unit [152], [169]
Session Duration [152], [169]
Time between Sessions [146]
Source Lifetime [1]
(Un-)Known Attack Sessions per Time Unit [1], [40], [148]
Number of Basic Flows per Time Unit [153], [164]
Number of Activity Flows per Time Unit [153]
How to detect changes in
attacks?
Ratios between different Time Units [154]
Sliding Window and Locality Statistics [147]
Deviation β value [1]
Linear Regression [152]
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How to compare propagation?
Propagation Graph [152]
Attack Graph [7]
#Unique Mutual Attackers per #Targets per Time
Slot
[7]
Phase Plots [1]
Association Rule Mining [145]
Destination Net Footprint Scan [1]
Ratio of Attackers per Number of Target Sensors [7]
PDF of First Destination Preference [1]
How to detect attack patterns?
SecViz Visualization [165]
Symbolic Aggregate approXimation (SAX) [154]
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [153], [176]
Sub-Space Clustering (SSC) [164]
Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) [169]
Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) [172], [176]
How to identify a root causes?
Cluster Coherency [145]
Double-Honeynet [176]
ISN [147]
Port Sequence [145]
Faulty EIP [178]
How to assess the risk? Communication Scope [164]
EWMA [182]
How to recognize exploits? Data-Driven Technique [92]
Memory Tainting [114]
highlight possible pitfalls and general reasoning which
has to be considered.
Lance Spitzner [183] formulated the first two prob-
lems, which are entrapment and privacy.
a) Entrapment Challenges: Entrapment can be de-
fined as the persuasion of an entity to commit a crime
although no previous intent to commit such a crime
existed. It can be argued that this does not apply to
honeypots, as they do not actively persuade anyone.
Server honeypots mimic production systems or services
and wait for incoming connections, they are virtually
invisible to other network participants unless they decide
to approach those system, for example due to an IP-
address range scan. Client honeypots make the first
request, however, they do not persuade to commit a
crime, as the exploitation is already prepared server-
sided, which means that the intent of a crime already
existed. On the other hand, a honeypot remains a system
consciously set up for attacks and sometimes even with
known security vulnerabilities which makes an attack
possible in the first place.
b) Privacy Challenges: The privacy issue elabo-
rates the data collection. The question arises whether
a honeypot is allowed to collect information about the
attackers without their knowledge or permission and thus
violate their privacy? In order to answer that question
one has to consider which type of data is saved by the
honeypot and how the data is used by the honeypot
systems and administrators.
Data is usually divided into two general categories,
meta-information and content. Meta-information stores
information about content and connections. For the IP
this is operational/transactional data like the IP-address,
IP-header, session-cookies, timestamp of the communi-
cation and so forth. This type of information is rather col-
lected by low-interaction honeypots, however, some con-
tent might be stored depending on the level of emulation.
Content data is the data which a sender actually intends
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to transmit, like email-text, keystrokes and files. High-
interaction honeypots focus on saving large amounts
of content data, although meta-information is stored
additionally. Furthermore, it is important to highlight the
purpose of a honeypot and how the meta-information or
content is used. As already stated, production honeypots
can be used to defend production systems. Although re-
search honeypots do not protect an organization directly,
they help to understand threats, develop countermeasures
and to fix exploitable bugs, therefore they contribute
indirectly to the safety. Content data has more privacy
issues then transactional data, as it also underlies the
copyright of the author. However, one has to consider
that on the one hand the attacker does not have any
authorized means to save data on those honeypots (like
a legitimate account) and on the other hand does decide
voluntarily to transmit the content.
Common practice in the internet shows that the pro-
cessing of transactional data is done frequently and
is not persecuted by many countries. However, some
countries such as Germany rate IP-addresses with an
affiliated timestamp as personal data since backtracking
of individuals is possible with the help of ISPs. That
is why a storage of non-anonymized IP-addresses is
only allowed for 7 days in order to ensure undisturbed
operation of services [184], [185]. Such local regulations
have to be considered although they might interfere with
the scientific freedom.
As long as tools attempt to secure one’s own systems
and their usage-emphasis lies in the improvement of
the protection, the legal risks seem to be negligible.
One should always keep in mind that honeypots do
not only communicate with criminal, malicious entities
but also with their victims. Hijacked systems are used
to propagate attacks, backscatter packets arrive a result
of spoofed IP-addresses. Because of that honeypot log
records should always be handled with care. As far
as is known, there was up to date no trial concerning
honeypots explicitly. However, this holds only as long
as the honeypot does not cause any harm, which leads
us to the next problem statement.
c) Liability Challenges: The third concern is the
liability in case of harming other systems. As honeypots
offer known vulnerabilities to attackers, they can be
used to harm other systems. Low-interaction honeypots
emulate protocols and therefore they can be subject of
a IP spoofing and amplification attack. High-interaction
honeypot might allow arbitrary code execution on the
machine and therefore cause even much higher damage
to other systems. This means, that the original attacker
is not visible to the victim, which in turn would sue the
operator of honeypots they appear to be the real attacker.
The argument here is, that if an administrator had taken
proper precautions to keep the (honeypot) systems se-
cure, the attacker would not have been possible, therefore
the administrator is jointly responsible for any damage
which has occurred. The higher the interaction level of
the honeypot the higher the risk of a harmful utilization.
Therefore verification checks should be done more often
on high-interaction honeypots. It is recommended to
reset virtual honeypots as often as possible and to use a
reverse firewall to limit the amount of malicious traffic
that can leave the honeypot, as it shows consciousness
and the attempt to minimize possible damage, which
might limit the legal liability. Another possibilities are
containment systems, which restrict the rate at which
a computer is allowed to make connections to other
machines, for example Dantus feedback control system
[186].
Not only the deployment has to be considered, but also
the development and publication of honeypot software,
as many countries including Germany have a valid
hacker paragraph, compare the German criminal law
code §202c [187]. This paragraph makes the publication
of software whose purpose is to spy out or intercept data
and facilitating hacking attacks a punishable offence, as
it is seen as a preparation of a crime. It is not completely
clarified which software is affected by this law. However,
a honeypot is collecting similar information, in the same
technical manner, as many other security tools like
IDS sensors or even system logs, and this category of
software is not banned.
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